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Supreme Court Voting Behavior
2004 Term
BY RICHARD G. WILKINS *, SCOTT WORTHINGTON **,
JACOB REYNOLDS ***, JOHN J. NIELSEN****
I. Introduction
This Study, the nineteenth in a series,' tabulates and analyzes the
voting behavior of the United States Supreme Court during the 2004
Term.2 The analysis is designed to measure whether individual Jus-
tices and the Court as a whole are voting more "conservatively,"
more "liberally," or about the same when compared with past Terms.
* Professor of Law, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University.
** J.D., J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, 1999.
*** J.D., J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, 2006.
**** J.D. Candidate, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, 2007.
1. Professor Robert E. Riggs began this Study with Supreme Court Voting Behavior:
1986 Term, 2 BYU J. Pub. L. 15 (1988). Professor Richard G. Wilkins continued the Study
in Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 1991 Term, 7 BYU J. Pub. L. 1 (1992) [hereinafter
1991 Study]. The last ten Studies, analyzing the 1993 to 2002 terms, have been published
in the Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly. See Richard G. Wilkins et al., Supreme
Court Voting Behavior: 1993 Term, 22 Hastings Const. L.Q. 269 (1995) [hereinafter 1993
Study]; Richard G. Wilkins et al., Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 1994 Term, 23 Hastings
Const. L.Q. 1 (1995) [hereinafter 1994 Study]; Richard G. Wilkins et al., Supreme Court
Voting Behavior: 1995 Term, 24 Hastings Const. L.Q. 1 (1996) [hereinafter 1995 Study];
Richard G. Wilkins et al., Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 1996 Term, 25 Hastings Const.
L.Q. 35 (1997) [hereinafter 1996 Study]; Richard G. Wilkins et al., Supreme Court Voting
Behavior: 1997 Term, 26 Hastings Const. L.Q. 533 (1999) [hereinafter 1997 Study]; Rich-
ard G. Wilkins et al., Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 1998 Term, 27 Hastings Const. L.Q.
423 (2000) [hereinafter 1998 Study]; Richard G. Wilkins et al., Supreme Court Voting Be-
havior: 1999 Term, 28 Hastings Const. L.Q. 543 (2001) [hereinafter 1999 Study]; Richard
G. Wilkins et al., Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 2000 Term, 29 Hastings Const. L.Q. 247
(2002) [hereinafter 2000 Study]; Richard G. Wilkins et al., Supreme Court Voting Behav-
ior: 2001 Term, 30 Hastings Const. L.Q. 307 (2003) [hereinafter 2001 Study]; Richard G.
Wilkins et al., Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 2002 Term, 31 Hastings Const. L. Q. 497
(2005) [hereinafter 2002 Study]; Richard G. Wilkins et al., Supreme Court Voting Behav-
ior: 2003 Term, 32 Hastings Const. L. Q. 769 (2005) [hereinafter 2003 Study].
2. The 2004 United States Supreme Court Term covers decisions made from Octo-
ber 2004 through July 2005.
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As in politics, whether a judicial trend is "conservative" or "liberal"
often lies in the eye of the beholder. On such a point, members of the
American Civil Liberties Union and the Federalist Society for Law
and Public Policy Studies might well disagree.
This Study attempts to remove this subjectivity by applying the
following consistent classification scheme to ten categories of cases
across time: "conservative" votes are those that favor an assertion of
governmental power, while "liberal" votes are those that favor a
claim of individual liberty! By tracking the term-to-term conserva-
tive or liberal changes in the voting patterns of individual Justices and
the Court as a whole across these ten categories,4 and by applying
standard statistical tests to the resulting data,5 this Study attempts to
provide reliable information regarding the current ideological posture
of the Court and its members, as well as conclusions and projections
regarding its past and future trends. Whether statistical analysis of a
complex and subjective process (such as judicial decision-making)
provides useful information may well be debatable.6 But, within the
limitations inherent in an attempt to "number crunch" ideology, this
annual survey offers students and practitioners information that is
useful for assessing how the Court or an individual Justice has
voted-and may vote in the future-in particular categories of cases.
The 2004 Term Study is notable for two reasons: (1) it tabulates
the final votes cast by two eminent Members of the United States Su-
3. There is no single, settled definition of conservatism or liberalism. See generally
M.A. RIFF, DICTIONARY OF MODERN POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES 67-73, 141-52 (1987) (dis-
cussing various possible interpretations of the terms). This Study's definitions, however,
are close to the core ideals of each ideology. See id. at 67 (noting that conservatism "im-
plies fear of sudden and violent changels], respect for established institutions and rulers,
support for elites and hierarchies and a general mistrust of theory as opposed to empirical
deductions"); see also id. at 142 (asserting that "twentieth century" liberalism is "com-
pounded of constitutionalism; doubtful [] of pluralism; certain [] of a belief in the virtues
of economic freedom, and less certain [] of a desire to restrict government intervention in
most other aspects of life").
4. See infra Data Tables 1-10.
5. See infra Appendix B.
6. The general reliability of statistical inference depends on random sampling. See
generally ROBERT V. HOGG & ALLEN T. CRAIG, INTRODUcTION TO MATHEMATICAL
STATISTICS 157-58 (5th ed. 1994); RAYMOND H. MYERS, CLASSICAL AND MODERN
REGRESSION WITH Applications 9-11 (2d ed. 1990). The Court's method of selecting
cases is far from random. Rather, it is the result of a conscious decisional process. Fur-
thermore, reliable statistics generally require large quantities of information to produce
reliable results. As sample sizes become, larger, inferences become more accurate. This
Study is subject to sampling bias, both because the sample is not random and because it is
comparatively small. The statistical inferences below, therefore, may not accurately repre-
sent a Justice's (or the Court's) views.
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preme Court, and (2) the tabulated data suggest the continuation (for
the third year in a row) of a liberal voting trend on the United States
Supreme Court The ideological posture of those who will ultimately
fill the current openings on the Court for the 2005 Term will deter-
mine whether a three-year liberal trend gathers speed, slows down, or
halts.
The Honorable William H. Rehnquist, Chief Justice of the
United States Supreme Court, passed away on September 3, 2005,8
and the Honorable Sandra Day O'Connor, Associate Justice of the
United States Supreme Court, announced her resignation approxi-
mately two months earlier.9 The late Chief Justice had been a consis-
tent conservative vote on the Court. ° Justice O'Connor, for her part,
had frequently cast the decisive vote in legally, socially and politically
important cases." Their absence during the 2005 Term will unques-
tionably alter the ideological stance of the Court.
The outcomes noted by the 2004 edition of this Study, moreover,
highlight how important the ideological leanings of the new Chief and
Associate Justices might be. Six of the 10 Tables of this Study dem-
onstrated liberal movement during the 2004 Term, as opposed to four
Tables producing conservative movement. 2 While various interpreta-
tions of the data on the various Tables is certainly possible, it appears
to us (on balance) that the 2004 Term continued the modest liberal
trend in Supreme Court voting behavior that began in 2002."
Liberal power (of various magnitudes of strength and reliability)
is manifest on six Tables. But, while conservative voting patterns
emerge on four Tables, the strength of the conservative voting power
on two of those four Tables (8 and 9) is questionable, and a four-
7. 2003 Study, supra note 1, at 819. Note: even though Justice O'Connor did an-
nounce her retirement, she will sit during the 2005 Term at least until her replacement is
confirmed.
8. The Chief Justice passed away on September 3, 2005, following nearly a year-long
struggle with thyroid cancer. http://www.cnn.com/2005/LAW/09/03/rehnquist.obit (last
visited 09 November 2005).
9. Justice O'Connor, the first woman to serve on the Supreme Court, announced her
resignation on the final day of the 2004 Term. http://www.
cnn.com/2005/LAW/07/01/resignation.supreme/ (last visited 17 September 2005).
10. See Constrained Conservative Frontier Chart 1.
11. See discussion of Table 10, Section IV, infra; Conclusion, infra.
12. Liberal movement was evidenced on Tables 2 (Federal Civil Cases), 3 (State
Criminal Cases), 4 (Federal Criminal Cases), 6 (Equal Protection Claims), 7 (Statutory
Civil Rights Claims) and 10 (Swing-Vote Cases), while conservative movement appeared
on Tables 1 (State Civil Cases), 5 (First Amendment Claims), 8 (Challenges to Federal
Jurisdiction) and 9 (Federalism Cases).
13. See discussion of Tables 1-10, Section IV, infra, and Conclusion, infra.
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member liberal bloc managed to control the outcome of Table 7 - de-
spite the individual conservative voting patterns of five other Justices.
These statistical factors, considered together with liberal control of
Swing-Vote Cases on Table 10 for the first time in six years, suggest
that conservative voting power was indeed ebbing during the last year
of William Rehnquist's service as Chief Justice.
If we are correct, the ideological views held by the replacements
confirmed for the Chief and Associate Justices will determine the fu-
ture viability of the Court's present trend. Replacement of the late
Chief Justice with a jurist less consistently conservative than William
H. Rehnquist, or selection of an Associate Justice even incrementally
more (or less) conservative than Justice O'Connor (the Supreme
Court's all-time swing-vote champion),1" will largely determine
whether the three-Term liberal trend noted by the 2004 Study contin-
ues, stops or reverses course.
II. Mode of Analysis
This Study is based on the tabulation and mathematical analysis
of each Justice's votes in ten categories of cases. Nine of the catego-
ries are based on the nature of the issues addressed (e.g., First
Amendment and Equal Protection) or on the character of the parties
involved (i.e., state or federal government litigants). 5 The tenth cate-
gory tabulates the number of times each Justice voted with the major-
ity in cases decided by a single, or swing, vote.
The first nine categories are designed to detect each Justice's at-
titude toward two broad issues underlying most Supreme Court deci-
sions: the protection of individual rights and judicial restraint. The
tabulation of votes in these nine categories reveals, in broad strokes,
the frequency with which individual Justices and the Court as a whole
vote to protect individual rights 6 or to exercise judicial restraint. 7
14. See Data Table 10, infra.
15. The categories are as follows: (1) civil controversies in which a state or one of its
officials or political subdivisions is opposed by a private party; (2) civil controversies in
which the federal government or one of its agencies or officials is opposed by a private
party; (3) state criminal cases; (4) federal criminal cases; (5) First Amendment issues of
freedom of speech, press, religion, and association; (6) Equal Protection claims; (7) statu-
tory civil rights claims; (8) issues of federal court jurisdiction, party standing, justiciability,
and related matters; and (9) federalism cases.
16. Votes implicating individual rights are tabulated in tables reporting the outcome
of state and federal criminal prosecutions.(Tables 3 and 4), as well as those detailing the
resolution of claims based on the First Amendment (Table 5), the Equal Protection Clause
(Table 6), and civil rights statutes (Table 7). The civil cases examined in Data Tables 1
and 2 also involve individual rights, as these suits pit the government against persons as-
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From the voting patterns that emerge, the Study determines
whether individual Justices and the Court are taking conservative or
liberal positions. The Study classifies outcomes that favor an asser-
tion of government power as "conservative" and outcomes that favor
a claim of individual rights as "liberal." Accordingly, the Study classi-
fies as conservative a vote for the government against an individual, a
vote against a claim of constitutional or statutory rights, a vote against
the exercise of federal jurisdiction, or a vote favoring state (as op-
posed to federal) authority on federalism questions. The Study classi-
fies all other votes as liberal.
This analytical scheme is not perfect. Unanimous decisions,
which constitute a significant portion of all cases decided by the
Court, are included in the Study's calculations even though liberal or
conservative ideology may not have influenced the outcome of such
cases. 8 Unanimous opinions often result when either the law or the
facts, or both, point so clearly in one direction that ideology is not a
decisional factor.' 9 Furthermore, concern for individual rights is not
always, or even necessarily, the attitudinal opposite of judicial re-
20straint.
serting private rights. The federalism decisions tabulated in Table 9 are less obviously
relevant to individual rights because such decisions focus on the balance of federal and
state authority. Nevertheless, in such cases, the practical effect of voting for the state is to
deny federal relief to a party alleging state encroachment upon his or her rights, and thus
is counted as a conservative vote.
17. Jurisdictional questions (Table 8), which exhibit the relative propensity of the Jus-
tices to avoid judicial decisions, are perhaps the most direct statistical evidence of judicial
restraint. Other tables included in the Study, however, also provide some indication of the
individual Justices' (and the Court's) positions on the "judicial restraint/judicial activism"
axis. Judicial restraint is normally identified with deference to the policy-making branches
of government, adherence to precedent, avoidance of constitutional bases of decision
when narrower grounds exist, respect for the Framers' intent when construing constitu-
tional text, and avoidance of issues rendered unnecessary by the doctrines of ripeness,
mootness, political questions, etc. As a result, a vote in favor of individual rights claims
(Tables 1-7) may provide some indication of "judicial activism" because judicial recogni-
tion of individual rights often requires the Court to overturn precedent or invalidate an
existing statute. Federalism issues (Table 9) are also relevant because judicial restraint is
traditionally identified with respect for the role of the states within the federal system.
18. Unanimous cases may comprise a significant portion of the cases tabulated on the
various tables. This Term, for example, two of four cases were decided unanimously on
Table 5 and six of ten cases were decided unanimously on Table 8.
19. An example of what seems to be a fairly non-controversial case for the court was
San Diego v. Roe, 125 S. Ct. 521 (2004)* (case was only eight pages long and decided by a
per curiam - or unsigned - opinion).
20. For example, Justice Scalia voted against the federal government on nine of the
13 cases tabulated on Table 4 (Federal/Criminal Cases) this Term. These votes result in a
surprisingly "liberal" voting record. However, Justice Scalia's "concern for individual
rights" on Table 4 this year does necessarily suggest that he has abandoned any commit-
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Despite the difficulties with our classification scheme, the basic
assumption that supports this Study-that the general orientation of
individual Justices and the Court regarding individual rights and judi-
cial restraint is suggestive of conservative or liberal ideology-
appears sound.2 For example, deference to legislatures frequently re-
sults in rejection of an individual's claim, especially one predicated
upon the impropriety of governmental action.22 Judicial restraint is
associated with a reluctance to read new rights into the Constitution
or statutes. 3 Refusal to exercise federal jurisdiction leaves the matter
to the state courts with their possible bias in favor of state govern-
mental action and is a clear rebuff to the claimant seeking federal
protection of rights.24 Therefore, to the extent that the Study's basic
ideological assumptions regarding liberal and conservative outcomes
are sound, it is possible to identify trends by tracking the voting pat-
terns reflected in Data Tables 1 through 10.25
To determine current ideological positions within the Court,
votes of the individual Justices can be compared with those cast by
other Justices this Term, as well as with the outcomes for the
ment to "judicial restraint." Several of Justice Scalia's votes on Table 4 reflect his prefer-
ence for giving statutory language its "plain" or "ordinary" meaning. See, e.g., United
States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 793 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting in part), Johnson v.
United States, 125 S. Ct. 1571, 1583 (2005)V (Kennedy, J., dissenting, joined by Scalia),
Pasquantino v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 1766, 1781, 1786-88 (2005) (Ginsburg, J., dissent-
ing joined by Scalia). While "plain meaning" resulted in a "liberal" voting pattern on Ta-
ble 4, Justice Scalia's enthusiasm for "plain meaning" may well flow from (rather than run
contrary to) his conservative values. See, e.g., supra note 3, above (noting that conserva-
tism "implies fear of sudden and violent change[s], respect for established institutions and
rulers, support for elites and hierarchies and a general mistrust of theory as opposed to
empirical deductions").
21. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. See also infra Part V.
22. See, e.g., Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Assn., 125 S. Ct. 2055 (2005)* (holding
that the Secretary of Agriculture's promotion of beef under the Beef Promotion and Re-
search Act of 1985 is not subject to a compelled-subsidy challenge from ranchers).
23. See id.
24. See, e.g., San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City and County of San Francisco, 125 S. Ct.
2491, 2500 (2005)* (declining to create an exception to the full faith and credit statute (28
U.S.C. § 1738) for claims brought under the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment in or-
der to assure an eventual federal forum for takings claims that must first be presented to
state courts).
25. Of course, the data are only as reliable as our assumptions. The Study's general
assumption that votes favoring individual rights reflect liberal views is almost certainly not
accurate in every case. For example, see Pasquantino v. United States, 125 S. Ct. at 1781,
1786-87 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting, joined by Scalia, J.) (voting against the government on
the ground that Congress did not plainly include in a criminal statute an exception to the
rule that the United States does not enforce another nation's tax laws). In this case, Jus-
tice Scalia - along with Justice Ginsburg - racks up a "liberal" vote, even though some
might assert that Justice Scalia's vote reflects a "conservative" value. See supra note 20.
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1986-2003 Terms. Likewise, the current ideological position of the
Court as a whole can be determined by comparing present outcomes
of the Court majority with those of prior Terms. In Data Tables 1-10,
this information appears in the form of voting percentages for each
Justice and for the Court majority. Charts 1-10, in turn, graphically
depict the voting trends revealed over the years in the outcomes of
Majority, Split and Unanimous cases on each Table.
Mean Tables 1-10 and Regression Tables 1-10 analyze the vot-
ing patterns of the individual Justices. The purpose of these tables is
to determine whether a Justice's 2004 Term voting record departs in a
statistically significant manner from his or her prior voting pattern
and whether any significant correlation exists among the Term-to-
Term voting patterns of the Justices. 6
The Study also calculates an anticipated 2005 Term voting score
for each Justice on each Table. This statistic is calculated with an Auto
Regressive Integrated Moving Average (ARIMA) forecasting model."
The ARIMA model is useful in situations where, as in this Study, a sin-
gle variable (a Justice's voting score) is forecast based only on its pre-
sent and prior values with no other explanatory variables.
In order to determine which categories best reveal the conserva-
tive and liberal leanings of the Court, we apply factor analysis. This
analysis tests the extent to which the Justices' disposition of the cases
on each of the first nine Tables may have been influenced by lib-
eral/conservative bias. Factor analysis has been used in various empiri-
cal studies of human behavior, including psychological inquiries into
such personal traits as personality and intelligence.' The results of the
factor analysis for the 2004 Term appear in Part V of this article.
Finally, Frontier Analysis Tables 1-4 and Frontier Charts 1-4
compare the Justices' conservative and liberal predilections this Term
and over the course of the entire Study. Frontier analysis mitigates
some of the analytical difficulties previously discussed by measuring
the strength of each Justice's tendencies relative to the rest of the
Court with respect to the cases actually decided in a given Term
rather than against an absolute scale.29
All of the data and statistics reported in this Study must be inter-
preted with caution. The percentages and statistical results revealed
in each table are affected not only by the dispositions of the individual
26. See infra Appendix B.
27. See infra Appendix B for a more detailed explanation of ARIMA.
28. See infra Appendix B for a more detailed analysis of factor analysis.
29. See infra Appendix B for a more detailed analysis of frontier analysis.
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Justices but also by the nature of the cases decided each Term. Fur-
thermore, Supreme Court cases are not the result of random selection
and the universe of votes cast by the Justices is relatively small. Since
both random sampling and large sample size are crucial elements of
any fully reliable statistical analysis, conclusions drawn from this Study
are hardly beyond dispute. There are obvious limitations to any em-
pirical analysis of a subjective decision-making process. °
In light of these caveats, one might ask whether this Study is
worth conducting or reading. We believe it is. For years, experienced
Supreme Court practitioners have attempted to divine the ideological
leanings of individual Justices in framing their arguments to the
Court. Moreover, both the media and academicians are fond of at-
taching ideological labels to the Court and its personnel. Supreme
Court practitioners, legal scholars and the public have long assumed
that assessments of Court ideology are valuable, even though such as-
sessments may be based upon little more than the gut reactions of the
attorneys, scholars and news reporters involved. This Study, based
upon a systematic methodology for objectively gathering, quantifying
and analyzing data over time, should be substantially more reliable
than these ad hoc assessments.
III. Overview of the Ideological Trends of the 2004 Term
The outcomes tabulated on six of ten Tables in 2004, considered
as a whole, manifest overall liberal movement. The Study this Term,
accordingly, documents continuation of a modest liberal trend that
began two Terms ago."
Liberal movement is noted on Tables 2, 3, 4, 6, 7 and 10. Factor
analysis indicates that Table 3 provides the most reliable evidence of
ideological bias this Term, while Table 4 is the fourth most reliable.32
Table 6, involving Equal Protection Claims, does not provide compel-
ling evidence of liberal movement, inasmuch as the Table has a his-
torically small sample base and the voting behaviors of the Justices
(and the Court) have been rather volatile over time.33 The reliability
of Table 7 may be questioned for similar reasons. This Term, how-
ever, Table 7 tabulates results from six cases involving Statutory Civil
Rights Claims, a fairly large sample (at least as the words "fairly large
30. See supra note 6.
31. 2003 Study, supra note 1, at 819.
32. See Factor Analysis, Section V, infra.
33. See discussion of Table 6, Section IV, infra. See, e.g., 2002 Study at 509-10; 2001
Study at 326; 2000 Study at 257-58; 1999 Study at 552.
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sample" are understood within the constraints of this Study). Fur-
thermore, the outcome in 2004 reflects a liberal high-water mark for
the Court on Table 7; an outcome achieved by a stable four-member
liberal voting bloc that prevailed in spite of five Justices who tallied
significantly more conservative individual voting patterns. The votes
cast by the four-member liberal bloc, in short, demonstrated solidar-
ity, while the votes cast by the generally conservative Justices evi-
denced fragmentation.
Four Tables demonstrate conservative movement, Tables 1, 5, 8
and 9. Table 1 - which reflects rather significant conservative move-
ment in the outcome of State Civil Cases - is the second most reliable
indicator of ideological bias according to factor analysis, while the
somewhat more ambiguous conservative movement on Table 9 is
ranked as the fourth most reliable indicator of bias.' On balance,
however, the liberal movement on Tables 2, 3, 4, 6, 7 and 10 seems
more noteworthy than the conservative movement on the remaining
four Tables.
The seemingly dramatic conservative movement on Table 1
merely brings the outcomes on that Table (involving State Civil
Cases) in line with historical outcomes on Table 2 (Federal Civil
Cases).35 This conservative movement, therefore, may simply indicate
that state officials are becoming (or were) more adept in presenting
their cases before the Court in 2004.36 The conservative movement on
Table 5 (as with the liberal movement on Table 6) has dubious valid-
ity for several reasons, including small sample size and unusually
volatile voting behavior by individual Justices on First Amendment
Claims during several recent Terms.37 The outcomes charted on Ta-
ble 8, which tabulates results in cases raising challenges to federal ju-
risdiction, remain rather liberal notwithstanding the Table's slight
conservative movement in 2004. The outcomes on Table 9, finally,
while conservative within the terms of this Study, do not suggest that
the Court tends to favor assertions of state over federal regulatory
power; on the contrary, the results of Table 9 can be read to support
34. Id.
35. See discussion of Table 2 in Section IV, infra.
36. Id.
37. Factor analysis does not suggest that Table 5 is a highly reliable indicator of ideo-
logical bias. See Factor Analysis, Section V, infra. Table 5 also reflects relatively few deci-
sions, which - in recent years - may have been affected by significant "pole switching" be-
havior. See, e.g., infra at 32-33; See also 2003 Study, supra note 1, at 814,2000 Study, supra
note 1, at 322; 1996 Study, supra note 1, at 91.
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precisely the contrary conclusion.38
Considered together, the data this Term appears to suggest ongo-
ing consolidation (and strengthening) of liberal voting power. Con-
tinuation of this trend will depend upon the ideological positions of
the jurists who replace William H. Rehnquist and the retired Sandra
Day O'Connor.
Data Table 1: Civil Cases - State Government versus a Private Party
In 2004 the Court dramatically reversed the liberal trend of the
past two Terms, with a strong conservative movement. The voting
pattern of every Justice was statistically significant and each Member
of the Court voted more conservatively than last year. In fact, there
are only four instances since the 1988 Term that any Justice has voted
more conservatively on Table 1 than in 2004. The Court as a whole,
moreover, moved conservatively in the outcome of Majority, Split
and Unanimous cases. Such unusual voting behaviors may result
from the facts or procedural posture of particular cases, which en-
courage "liberal Justices" to take "conservative" positions - and vice
versa (sometimes denominated in this Study as "pole switching").
While at least one case on Table 1 may evidence pole switching,39 the
overall movement on Table 1 is so significant that this phenomenon
does not appear to provide anything close to an adequate explana-
tion. The Court, it seems, was markedly more conservative in 2004 in
cases involving state government.
Data Table 2: Civil Cases - Federal Government versus a Private Party
The Court registered slight liberal movement on Table 2, Federal
Civil Cases. The individual rankings of the Justices were somewhat
interesting, with Justice Breyer as the conservative leader and Justice
Souter the liberal standard bearer. Justice Breyer has held (or
shared) the "conservative top" several times before (in 1999 and
1996), but Justice Souter has not been the most liberal Justice on Ta-
ble 2 at any time during the past decade. The actual voting behavior
of every Justice was rather close to that anticipated in the 2003 Study;
all of the Justices' scores were anticipated within ten points and three
Justices (Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Stevens and O'Connor)
voted within five points of their anticipated behavior. The import of
the liberal movement on Table 2 is lessened by the fact that even the
38. See discussion of Table 9 in Section IV, infra.
39. See, e.g., Kelo v. New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005) (discussed infra in Section
IV, Table 1).
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most liberal member of the Court (Justice Souter) voted with the fed-
eral government 50% of the time.
Data Table 3: Criminal Cases - State Government versus a Private Party
Factor analysis indicates that Table 3 provides the most reliable
evidence of conservative or liberal bias on the Court this Term, and
the movement (considered as a whole) is liberal. Majority, Split, and
Unanimous decisions all showed liberal movement from the prior
Term. The anticipated voting behavior on Table 3 this Term was also
rather accurate. Justice Thomas again led the conservative bloc, with
Justices Souter and Stevens tied in the most liberal positions on the
Table. Some things to note on Table 3 are: (1) the late Chief Justice
"took no part in the decision" of six questions tabulated on the Table,
and (2) what might be called "the Justice O'Connor factor." The sub-
stantial liberal movement on the Court may well be related to Justice
O'Connor's individual voting behavior.' As with Table 2, and despite
the liberal movement in 2004, the Court has retained a generally con-
servative stance in State Criminal Cases: half of all cases on Table 3
were decided in favor of the state governments.
Data Table 4: Criminal Cases - Federal Government versus a Private Party
This Table evidenced liberal movement for the Court as a whole,
with interesting individual and group voting behaviors. Justices
Thomas and Scalia both made rather significant liberal gains - per-
haps explained by their adherence to "conservative" canons of strict
judicial construction of criminal statutes. Seven of the nine Justices
also evidenced statistically significant movements in their voting be-
havior on Table 4 (as compared with past Terms). Chief Justice
Rehnquist, in his last Term of service on the Court, maintained his
position as the most conservative Justice in Federal Criminal Cases,
while Justices Stevens, Souter and Ginsburg tied for the most liberal
Members of the Court, favoring the federal government with only
15.4% of their votes.
The Court continued the erratic behavior that has dominated the
outcome of cases on Table 4 since the 1999 Term. Majority, Split and
Unanimous issues were all decided more liberally this Term, which
moved the Court substantially away from last Term's more conserva-
tive posture. The tabulations shown on Table 4 over the past five
Terms reveal continuing unsteadiness in the Court's resolution of
federal criminal cases.
40. See discussion of Table 3, Section IV, infra.
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Data Table 5: First Amendment Rights of Expression, Association and
Religion
This Table showed conservative movement as a whole from the
prior Term. The outcomes on Table 5 remain volatile, partly because
of the few number of First Amendment questions that have come be-
fore the Court: last Term there were only seven issues tabulated and
this Term there were only four. Only Table 6, Equal Protection, has a
smaller data set.
Perhaps the most notable observation on Table 5 involves the
voting behavior of Justice Thomas. In 2004, Justice Thomas holds the
position as the most conservative Justice on First Amendment issues.
Last Term's Study noted his receptiveness to such claims; in 2004 he
failed to vote for a First Amendment claim even once. Justices Scalia
and Thomas also demonstrate rather highly correlated voting patterns
Table 5 this Term.
Data Table 6: Equal Protection Claims
The Court only decided four equal protection claims this Term,
but a low number of cases on Table 6 is not unusual.4' Three of those
four cases were decided in favor of the claim. Although this is a
rather striking liberal outcome, its significance should not be over-
stated: because of the small universe of cases, Table 6 is (again) the
least reliable indicator of ideological bias.43 In contrast to last Term,
the voting blocs on Table 6 in 2004 were less fractured.
Data Table 7: Statutory Civil Rights Claims
The Court on Table 7 set a liberal high-water mark for this
Study, with the Court voting in favor of 83.3% of Statutory Civil
Rights Claims - topping last year's previous high of 66.7%.46 Table 7
41. In the previous three Terms there have been only 5 Equal Protection cases. See
2003 Study, supra note 1, at 779 (one case); 2002 Study, supra note 1, at 507 (four cases);
2001 Study, supra note 1, at 316 (no cases).
42. Miller-El v. Dretke, 125 S. Ct. 2317 (2005),* Johnson v. California (57), 125 S. Ct.
2410 (2005),* Halbert v. Michigan, 125 S. Ct. 2582 (2005).*
43. See infra Section V.
44. See 2003 Study, supra note 1, at 779 n.42.
45. For example, in Johnson v. California(57), 125 S. Ct. at 2412 (2005), the voting
coalitions were well-defined: Stevens, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
Rehnquist, C. J., and O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ.,
joined. Breyer, J., filed a concurring opinion. Thomas, J., filed a dissenting opinion.
46. See infra Data Table 7.
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has tabulated the results of six or fewer cases since the 2002 Term. "
Accordingly, small sample size limits the inferences that may be drawn
from the data. Nevertheless, in 2004 the only case decided against the
claim was a unanimous opinion (where the outcome may be less influ-
enced by ideology than in split decisions).' Accordingly, Table 7 in
2004 may indicate greater liberal movement with regard to statutory
civil rights claims than for any Term during the past ten years.
Data Table 8: Cases Raising a Challenge to the Exercise of Federal
Jurisdiction
Federal jurisdiction cases show slight conservative movement in
2004, down nearly three points in the outcome of Majority opinions
and 3.9 points in the outcome of Split decisions. Unanimous deci-
sions are down a more substantial 13.3 points.49 Despite this conser-
vative movement, however, neither the Justices nor the Court (con-
sidered as a whole) are markedly more conservative on jurisdictional
issues than in the past.
Six of the nine Justices voted more liberally this Term than last,
with the voting behavior of four (Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
Souter, Kennedy and Scalia) departing in a statistically significant
manner from their past behaviors on Table 8.50 Moreover, every
member of the Court voted liberally on Table 8 at least 50% of the
time, including Justice Thomas (who was the only member of the
Court who did not do so last Term).'
Data Table 9: Federalism Cases
The liberal trend that began in federalism cases in 2002 stalled
this Term, except in the outcome of Unanimous Cases. The Court
decided the outcome of Majority Cases about eight points more con-
servatively than last Term and 21.4 points more conservatively in
Split Cases.3 The outcome in Unanimous Cases, by contrast, moved
in a liberal direction, with the Court voting for the State in only 40%
of the cases, down 10 points from last Term. 3
According to factor analysis, Table 9 is the third most reliable in-
47. Numbers the past three years: 2004:6; 2003:5; 2002:5.
48. Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams, 125 S. Ct. 1453 (2005).*
49. See infra Data Table 8.
50. Id.; See also infra Mean Table 8.
51. See infra Data Table 8.
52. See infra Data Table 9.
53. Id.
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dicator of ideological bias this Term. If so, there may not be a strong
wellspring of conservative power in federalism cases in the near future,
especially with the retirement of Justice O'Connor and death of Chief
Justice Rehnquist. Despite Justice O'Connor's rather consistent role as
a swing voter,54 both the late Chief Justice and Justice O'Connor
tended to favor the states in federalism cases.5 The views of their suc-
cessors could significantly alter the outcomes tabulated on Table 9.
Data Table 10: Swing-Vote Cases
Table 10 charts two "firsts": (1) a three-way tie for the "top swing
voter" and (2) every member of the Court voted with the majority at
least half the time. Justices O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter cast the
deciding vote in 61.9% of cases decided by one vote. Somewhat sur-
prisingly, every member of the Court joined the controlling swing
vote bloc at least half the time: Justices Stevens and Breyer joined
57.1% of these cases; Justices Scalia, Thomas and Ginsburg joined
52.4%; and the late Chief Justice joined 50%-becoming in 2004 the
least influential Member of the Court in closely divided cases. 6 But
the Chief Justice's voting record is remarkable for more than the fact
that he landed at the "bottom" of Table 10: this is the only time in the
past decade that the "least influential Justice" has nevertheless joined
50% of the controlling swing-vote opinions. 7
The Court took a liberal turn in the outcome of Swing Vote
Cases, with liberal coalitions controlling the outcome of 52.4% of
closely divided cases - the first time liberal coalitions have governed
these cases since 1998.58 The anticipated voting behaviors of the indi-
vidual Justices were fairly accurate, with seven voting within 10 points
of their projected scores. 9 In voting movements that perhaps reflect
the liberal orientation on Table 10 this Term, Justice O'Connor voted
19.4 points less often - while Justice Stevens voted 18 points more of-
ten - with the swing-vote majority than last Term's Study anticipated.
54. Justice O'Connor has ranked as either the first or second most influential swing
voter on the Court every Term but one (1997) since 1995. See Data Table 10.
55. See, e.g., Justice O'Connor's dissenting opinion in Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct.
2195, 2220 (2005) this Term. In addition, review of Table 9 demonstrate that the Chief
Justice and Justice O'Connor were, more often than not, tabulating conservative outcomes
Term to Term on federalism issues.
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Data Table I
Civil Cases: State Government Versus a Private Party
Justice % Votes for Gove ment X2 2004 Term Anticipated Scores
Votes
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 200 2001 2002 2003 2004 For Against 2004 Error 2005
Term Term Term Tern Term Term Term Term Tenn Term Govt Govt Term Term
Thomas 67.4 77A 60.0 65.5 50.0 60.0 75.0 60.0 53.3 89.5 17 2 59.6 29.9 59.7
Kennedy 432 71.9 33.3 31.7 44.4 53.3 68.8 36.0 57.1 84.2 16 3 49,8 34.4 62.0
Rehnquist 43.8 84.9 60.0 65.5 66.7 60.0 75.0 40.0 53.3 82.4 14 3 56.5 25.9 54.2
Scalia 52.9 17.4 60.0 55.2 50.0 60,0 62.5 48.] 53.9 78.9 t5 4 54A 24.5 56.0
Breyer 29.4 54.6 46.7 44.8 52.9 35.7 50.0 48.0 35.7 73.7 14 3 45.7 28.0 23.4
OPConnor 47.1 68.8 53.3 55.2 55.6 53.3 53.3 44.0 40.0 68.4 13 6 40.4 28.0 53.3
Sauter 29.4 54.6 46.7 37.9 50.0 53,9 43.8 52.0 42.9 63.2 2 7 45.7 17.5 43.3
Ginsburg 35.3 53. 46.7 3t.0 44,4 462 50.0 36.0 35.7 57.9 1I 8 53.9 2.0 42.0
Stevens 23.5 48.3 37.3 17.2 412 40.0 37.5 54.2 28.6 52.6 0 1 41.1 11.5 29.4
Majority 32.9 72.7 46.7 44.8 55.6 600 681 S2.01 46.7 73.7 141 5- 30.51 23.21 59.4
Split 72.7 69.2 33.3 47.3 3 8.3 6., 70.01 44.41 30.0 667 8 4
Unanimous 3 6.71 73.0 53.A 41.7 50.0 30.0 66.71 36.31 400 837 6 1
Chart I
Civil Cases; State Government Versus a Private Party
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Regression Table I
Civil Cases- State Govemment Versus a Private Party
Correlation (p) / R1
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Data Table 2
Civil Cases; Federal Govemment Vetus a Private Party
Justice otes tor Government X2 2004 Term Anticipated Scores
Votes
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 For Aainst 2004 E. 2005
Term Term Tern Tent Term T ent Term Term Term Tenrm Gov't Gov't Term Term
Breyer 60.0 73.9 57.1 61.1 70.0 50.0 66.7 72.7 75.0 87.3 7 1 79.8 7.7 83.5
Thomas 65,0 40.9 33.3 55.6 40.0 52.9 45.8 63.6 75.0 75.0 6 2 70.9 4,1 72.7
Ginsburg 85.0 65.2 40.9 684 50.0 52.9 66.7 72.7 66.7 75.0 6 2 66.1 8,9 71.6
Rehnquist 75.0 69.6 38.1 50.0 70.0 58.8 70.8 90.9 79.2 71.4 S 2 70.9 0.5 68.9
Stevens 63.2 65.2 35.0 68.4 50.0 64.3 62.5 50.0 69.6 62.5 5 3 61.7 0.8 67.5
OConnor 62.5 $9.1 61.9 73,3 60,0 50.0 61 9 54.6 83.3 62.5 5 3 57.9 4.6 61.5
Scalia 60.0 45.5 52.4 61.1 60.0 56.3 56.5 63.6 73.9 62.5 3 65.9 -3.4 59.6
Kennedy 80.0 63.6 45.51 50.0 50.0 47.1 62.5 90.9 75.0 62.5 5 3 69.4 .6.9 65.0
Souter 75.0 69.6 47.6 66.7 50.0 52.9 50.(0 63.6 75.0 50.0 4 4 54.6 4.6 600
Majority 75.0 69.61 36.41 61.1l 50.0 47A1 75.0F -31.8 7-9.2 75.0 61 21 70.81 4.21 72.31
Split 63.6 69.2 26.7 50.0 33.3 44.4 69.21100.01 66.7 60.0 3 2
MUnnio 88-91 70. 57.1 75.0 750 5. 18 77.81 91.71 100.' 3 f
Chart 2
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Regression Table 2
Civil Cases: State Government Versus a Private Party
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Out* Table 3
Criminal Cases: State Govemment Versu a Private Pony _
Justice % Votes for Govemment X2 2004 Term Anticipated Scores
Votes
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 For Against 2004 Erme 2003
Term Term Term Term Term Term Term Tom Term Tenn Gov% Gov't Tem Term
Thomas 66.7 63.6 92.3 80.0 82.6 66.7 84.6 94.1 80.0 80.8 21 5 83.5 -2.7 79.3
Scalia 5S.6 63.6 84,6 72.7 82.6 66.7 84.6 82.4 76.9 76.9 20 6 83.7 -6.8 77.0
Rehnquist 66.7 63.6 76.9 72.7 87.0 58.3 84.6 82.4 76.9 65.0 13 7 75.0 -10.0 75.0
Kennedy 55.6 54.6 76.9 54.6 78.3 50.0 76.9 64.7 64.C0 61.5 16 10 64.7 -3.2 63.9
O'Connor 44.4 63.6 71.4 63.6 78.3 50.0 46.2 62.; 69.2 53.8 14 12 62.3 -8.5 58.2
Breyer 22.2 36.4 50.0 36.4 40.9 25.0 30.8 29.4 44.0 46.2 12 14 30.8 15.4 41.1
Ginsburi 33.3 45.5 42.9 27.3 36A 25.0 23.1 23.5 36.0 34.6 9 17 22.6 12.0 27.9
Stevens 22.2 18.2 23.1 9.1 27.3 33.3 154 29.4 32.0 231 6 20 25.4 -2.3 25.9
Souter 22.2 54.6 57.1 36.4 27.3 33.3 23.1 35.31 40.01 23.1 6 20 34.9 -11.8 23.
IMajority S5.6 636 1,4 63. 5.2 50. &0. 8i 63.0 S0.0 13 13 59.8 .9.8 62.3
ISplit 75.0 300.0 66.7 77.81 62.5 60.0 40.0 50.0' 62.5 44.4 8 10
lUn"irws 40.0 33.3 80. 0.0 714 4. 30 80.0: 63.6: 62.3 ___ 3
Chart 3
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Regression Table 3
Criminal Cases: State Government Versus a Private Party
Correlation (0) Y R,
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Data Table 4
Criminal Cas s: Federal Government Vc.s a Private Part
Justice % Votes lor Govrnment X2 2004 Tenr Anticipated sees
Voes
1995 19 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 For Against 2004 Error 2005
Ten Te TeTe Tent Te Tc. Tr m Te erm Term Gov't Gov't Tern Term
Rehnquist 71.4 84.6 70.0 76.9 63.5 57.1 100.0 66,7 80,0 72.7 8 3 65.6 7.1 72.7
O'Connor 71.4 92.3 80.0 84.6 54.6 57.1 100.0 40.0 72.7 61.5 8 5 63.9 -2.4 71.4
Kennedy 71.4 84.6 90.0 76.9 54.6 28.6 100.0 50.0 72.7 61.5 8 5 60.9 0.6 73.1
Thomas 714 84.6 90.0 61.5 54.6 85.7 87.5 67 800 $3.8 7 6 74.8 -2t0 76.9
tlrcyer 71.4 69.2 70.0 53.9 45.5 28.6 200.0 33.3 54.6 38.5 S 8 39.0 .-0.5 48.4
Scalia 78.6 92.3 70.0 46.2 63.6 85.7 100.0 60.0 70.0 30.8 4 9 74.3 .43.5 65.7
Stevens 50.0 53.9 55.6 38.5 364 14.3 62.5 0.0 45. 25.4 2 I1 19.S -4.1 37.0
Sourer 786 84.6 70.0 462 36.4 16.7 75.0 33.3 36.4 15.4 2 It 32.8 -17. 26.3
Ginsbum 71,4 76.9 60.0 53.9 36.4 28.6 75,0 33.3 54.6 15A 2 it 32.0 -16.6 45.5
Majority 78.6 84.6 80.0 61.5 54.5 2.6 100.0 33.3 .72.7 46.2 6 7 5. . .
Split 85.7 75.0 66.7 55.6 57.2 20.0 200.0 33.3 200.0 55.6 5 4
Unanimous 71A. 100.0 200.0 75.0 50.0 50.0 100.0 33.3 571 25.0 2
Chart 4
Criminal Cases: Federal Government Vmus a Private Party
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S.6t 563 14.2 10.64 1.38 Y"
Thon, 74.4 -0. 9 5 13.25 $3.95 yes
G(lh, $5.4 -212.9 16.56 15.38 )e
IBM- 1 59.6 - 17.2 21.02 38.46 ses
Regression Table 4
Criminal Cases: Federal Government Versus a Private Party
Correlation (p) I R2







Ginsburg 0.8410.67 0.78/0.57 0.74/0.50 0.95/0.89
Brayer 0.78/0.56 0.86/0.71 0.83/0.66 1 0.86/0.71 0.87/0.72 0.880.74
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Data Table 5
First Amendmem Rights of Expression. Assoc iaton. and Religion
Justice % Votes for Claim X2 2004 Tcrm Amticipated Sces
I Votes
1995 1996 1997 1993 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 For Against 2004 Primr 2005
Tenn Term Term Term Term Tarm Term Term Term Tern Claim Clam Term Term
Stevens 62.5 42.9 0.0 100.0 37.5 50.0 66.7 33.3 33.3 75.0 3 1 44.0 31.0 40.5
Soutr 37.5 57.1 100.0 100.0 28.6 50.0 66.&7 25.0 33.3 75.0 3 1 43.3 31.7 55.1
Kennedy 87.5 57.1 0.0 100.0 77.8 75.0 66.7 0.0 50.0 50.0 2 2 52.5 .2.5 46.6
3insburg 75.0 57.1 0.0 100.0 33.3 50.0 55.6 25.0 33.3 50.0 2 2 23.3 26.2 30.9
Rehnquist 62.5 28.6 0.0 50.0 44.4 25.0 22.2 0.0 33.3 25.0 I 3 31.4 -6.4 34.1
O'Connor 62.5 2.6 0.0 50.0 33.3 50.0 55.6 0.0 16.7 25.0 1 3 25.5 -0.5 25.4
Breyer 75.0 14.3 0.0 50.0 12.5 75.0 35.6 25.0 16.7 25.0 1 3 10.0 15.0 2.5
Scalia 37.5 85.7 00 100.0 56.6 25.0 14.4 25.0 66.7 0.0 0 3 45.8 .45.9 63.6
Thomas 37.5 85.7 0.0 100.0 66.7 25.0 66.7 25.0 100.0 0.0 0 3 30.2-30.2 100.0
Majority 75.0 28.6 0.0 100.0 44.4 75.0 66.7 25.0 42.9 25.0 3 52.5 .27.5 38.5
SpIn 71,4 2&6 00 t00.0 5.00 100.0 71"4 33.0 40.01 0.01 0 2
Lnanimous 100.0 0.0 0.0 1000 0.0 0.0 50.0 0.0 30.0 50.01 _ 1
Chart 5
First Amendment Rights of Expresslon. Association, and Religion
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Regression Table 5
First Amendmet Righls of Expression, Ass.ociation, and Religion
Correlation (p)t R2
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Data Table 6
Equal Prolection Claims
Justice % Votes for Claim X2 2004 Term, Amicipated Scores
Votes
19953 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 For Against 2004 Erro 2005
Term Term Trnm Term Term, Term Term Term Term Tenr Claim Claim Trem Term
Stevens 40.0 40.0 50.0 0.0 100.0 23.0 0.0 2-5.0 1000 100.0 4 0 30.1 69.9 53.3
O'Connor 80.0 50.0 50.0 0.0 100.0 50.0 0.0 40.0 100.0 75.0 3 I 45.4 29.6 65.8
Kennedy 80.0 33-3 50.0 0.0 100.0 50.0 0.0 60.0 100.0 75,0 3 I 70.3 4.7 65.5
Soter 40.0 20.0 100.0 0.0 100.0 50.0 0.0 20.0 100,0 75.0 3 1 22.8 52.2 50.5
Ginsburg 40.0 20.0 100.0 0.0 100.0 50.0 0.0 20.0 100.0 75.0 3 I 26.5 48.5 52.2
Breyer 40.0 20.0 100.0 0.0 100.0 50.0 0.01 40.0 100.0 75.0 3 I 57.2 17.8 70.3
Rehnquisz 60.0 0.0 50.0 0.0 100.0 50.0 0.0 60.0 100.0 333 I 2 50.6 -17,3 69.8
Scalia 40.0 23.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 50.0 0.0 60.0 100.0 250 1 3 72.2 -47.2 59,6
Thma 50.0 25.0 0.0 0.0 100.A 50.0 0.0 60.0 100.0 0.0 0 4 79.5 -795. 67.2
majority 80.0 20.0 50.01 0.0 100.0 25.0 0.01 40.01 100.0 75.0" 3 11 48.51 26.51 59.41
Split 100.0 33.3 50.0 0.0 0.0 25.0 0.01 50.01 0.0 75.0 31 I
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Regression Table 6
Equal Protection Claims
Correlation (p) / R'





Souter 0.85/0.69 0.78/0.59 0.7810.58
Thomas 0.88/0.75 0.96/0.91
Ginsburg 0.88/0.75 0.81/0.63 0.80/0.60 1.0011.00
8reyer 0.77/0.5 0.85/0.70 0.78/0.57 1 0.80/0.59 0.99/0.97 0.99/0.97
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Data Table 7
Stattory Civil Rights Claims
Justice % Votes for Claim X2 2004 T.m Anticipated Seores
Votes
95 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 For Asainst 2004 linao 2005
Tam Term Term Tem Term Term Term Tam Tarm Tam, Claim Claim Term Term
Stevens 833 85.7 84.6 8.2 75.0 100.0 53.3 20.0 66.7 83.3 S 2 61.7 21.6 66.5
Sourer 66.7 92.9 76.9 70.6 75.0 100.0 60.0 20.0 80.0 83.3 5 1 72.7 10.6 86.6
Ginsburg 66.7 78.6 76.9 70.6 75.0 100.0 60.0 40.0 66.7 83.3 5 2 66.3 16.8 69.9
Breyer 83.3 85.7 84.6 82.4 75.0 100.0 53.3 40.0 80.0 83.3 5 54.8 28.5 83.0
O'Connor 33.3 64.3 41.7 38.8 25.0 33.3 26.7 40.0 66.7 33.3 2 4 59.2 -25.9 58.9
Scalia 16.7 50.0 23.1 41.2 23.0 0.0 13.3 40.0 66.7 33.3 2 4 44.0 -10.7 30.1
Kennedy 16.7 50.0 61.5 47.1 25.0 33.3 20.0 40.0 66.7 33.3 2 4 43.7 -20.4 35.2
Thomas 16.7 50.0 23.1 23.5 23.0 0.0 20.0 40.0 50.0 33.3 2 4 453 -12.0 32.
Rchnquist 16.7 50.0 30.8 35.3 25.0] 33.3 13.3 40.0 50.0 20.0 4 23.2 -3.2 37.7
NljoIt 33.3 57.2 61.5 64.7 23.0- 33.3 26.71 4.0. 667 3.3 
3 I 42.3 42.0 81.5
Splt 23.0 26.7 62. 63.6 0.01 33.3 33.3 500 6.100.0 3
lrmanimous 5. 873 60.0 66.71 30.0 0.0 8. 33 6.7 0.01 01
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,Breyer 0.96/0.92 0.91/0.81 0.90/0.79
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Data Table 8
Cmos Raising a Ch nleng to the Exercise of Federal Jurisdiction
Justice % Voes for Claim X2 2004 Term Anticipated Scores
VOtes
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 200 2002 2003 2004 For Against 2004 Error 2005
Term Term Term Term Term Term Tern Term Term Term Claim Claim Term Term
Sourer 68.4 56.5 60.7 60.0 83.3 68.4 83.3 54.6 69,6 75.0 6 2 70.5 4.5 73.3
Rehnqust 42.9 56.5 60.0 45.0 66.7 52.4 66.7 34.6 54.6 625 5 3 54.5 8.0 55.5
Stevens 75.0 69,6 51.7 6.0 100.0 68.4 83.3 47.6 77.3 62-5 5 3 68.5 -6.0 70.7
Kennedy 57.1 56.5 58.6 55.0 83.3 61.9 58.3 50.0 54.6 62-5 5 3 55.8 6.7 58.7
Ginsbur 68.4 36.5 55.2 60.0 83.3 61.9 83.3 54.6 81.8 62.5 5 3 789 -16.4 69.
Salia 42.9 47.8 43.3 40.0 66.7 47.6 50.0 31.8 52.6 37.1 4 3 43.1 14.0 49.2
Thomas 42.9 47.8 46.7 45.0 83.3 47.6 58.3 38.1 45.S 37.1 4 3 34.2 22.9 45.9
O'Connor 47.6 54.6 43.3 53.0 83.3 47.4 63.6 66.7 66.7 50.0 4 4 635 -13.5 59.7
Breyer 63.2 65.2 51.7 6.0 66.7 60.0 83.3 63.6 77.3 50.0 4 4 74.1 -24.1 60.9
Majority 57.1 52.2 58.61 53,0 83.3 61.9 66.71 54.61 65.21 62.5 5 31 63.01 -0.51 6623
Split 50.0 28.61 73.3 42,91 66.7 62.3 30.0 60.0 53.91 50.0
Unantimous 66.7 62.5 42.9 61.5 100.0 61.3 75.0 50.0 80.0' 66.7 4 '
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Regression Table 8
Cases Raising a Challenge to the Exercise of Federal Jurisdiction
Correlation (p)/ R
lustice Rehnquist Stevens Oyonnor Scalia Kamndy Sauter Thomas Ginsburg
Stevens
(YConnor 0.77/0.57
Scalia 0.82/0.66 0.74/0.52 0.7410.52
Kennedy 0.81/0.63 0.71/0.47 0.7410.52 0.83/0.67
Souter 0.85/0.70 0.74/0.52 0.11/0.47 0.81/0.63 0.8510.71
thomas 0.77/0.57 0.830.67 0.11/0.47 0.88/0.76 0.910.81 0.80/0.62
Ginsburg 0.78/0.56 0.91/0.80 0.8110.62 0.81/0.62 0.77/0.55 0.9310.85 0.75/0.51
Breye 0.84/0.67
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Data Table 9
Federalism Cases
Justice % Votes fow Stae X2 2004 Term Anticipated Scores
Voes
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 For Against 2004 Ero 2005
Term Term Term Term Term Term Term Term Tert Term State State Term Term
Rehnquist 51.9 75.6 36.8 60.0 46.7 50.0 50.0 35.7 54.6 50.0 4 4 36.7 13.3 43.4
Stevens 29.6 45.0 35.0 8.0 26.7 35.7 30.0 35.7 36.4 $0.0 4 4 35.8 14.2 37.8
O'Connor 44.4 70.7 29.4 45.8 46.7 35.7 60.0 35.7 45.5 50.0 4 4 35.0 15.0 36.0
Thomas 56.0 732 36.8 64.0 60.0 57.1 70.0 64.3 50.0 50.0 4 4 65.2 -15.2 64.5
Sauter 34.6 43.9 15.8 32.0 20.0 35.7 30.0 28.6 45.5 37.5 3 3 28.1 9.4 383
Ginsbu, rg 38.5 51.3 36.8 28.0 33.3 28.6 40.0 42.9 36.4 37.5 3 34.2 3.3 36.6
Breycr 34.6 50.0 15.8 32.0 13.3 35.7 30.0 28.6 36.4 37.5 3 5 27.4 10.1 35.8
Scalla 55.6 73.2 31.6 52.0 46.7 57.1 55.6 57.1 60.0 25.0 2 6 65.7 -40.7 59 9
Kennedy 51.9 68.3 42.1 40.0 533 42.9 70.0 50.01 54.6 25.0 2 6 49.7 .24.7 51.2
Majority 51.9 68.3 31.6 36.0 46.7 42.9 50.0 42.9 36.4 37.5 3 A 40.21 -2.7 38.31
split 62.5 63.2 44.4: 46.7 54.6 44.A 57.1 50.0 26.6 50.0 2 2
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Data Table 10
Swng-Vote Analysis: Who Votes Most Often with the Majority in Close Cases?
Justice % Votes for Majority X2 2004 Term Anticipated Scores
Votes
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 For Against 2004 rror 2005
Term Term Term Tents Term Term Term Term Term Term Mal Mal Term Tenn
O'Connor 80.0 75.0 53.3 75.0 84.6 66.7 84.0 100.0 73.7 61.9 13 8 81.3 -19.4 72.8
Kenedy 85.0 81.3 87.5 67.9 73.1 83.3 80.0 56.3 63.2 61.9 13 8 68.2 -6.3 64.7
Souter 30.0 43.8 43.8 46.4 34.6 433 28.0 56.3 $5.6 61.9 13 8 42.4 19.5 56.5
Stevens 25.0 50.0 43.8 60.7 26.9 43.3 24.0 37.5 55.6 57.1 12 9 39.1 18.0 40.5
Bryr 25.0 43.8 36.3 50.0 19.2 36.7 32.0 56.3 44.4 57.1 12 9 45 22.2 48,5
Scalia 75.0 56.3 50.0 50.0 73.1 63.3 80.0 43.8 55.6 52.4 II 10 57.8 -5.4 53.0
Thomas 75.0 56.3 56.3 50.0 84.6 63.3 80.0 43.8 63.2 52.4 : 0 62 -.9 66A
Ginsbhg 30.0 31.3 56.3 53.6 30.8 36,7 20.0 ,8 55.8 52.4 ' 0 49.3 2.9 48
Rehnquist 75.0 62.5 56.3 464 76.9 63.3 72.0 62.5 47.4 50.0 9 9 59.7 -9.7 56,2
Consivati, 60.0 56.3 43.7 42.9 61.5 60.0 68.0 56.3 37.9 47.6 10 11 56.21 8.6 563
.iberal 40.0 43.7 56.3 57.2 38,5 40.0 32.0 43.8 42.2 52.4 2 20 43.8 8.6 43.7
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Regression Table 10
Swing-Vote Analysis: Who Votes Most Often with the Majority in Close Cases
Correlation (p)/ R2






Thomas 0.76/0.55 -0.72/0.48 0.89/0.78 -0.840.69
Ginsburg -0.85/0.69 0.79/0.60 -0.81/0.62
Breyer -0.80/0.59 0.71/0.45 0.91/0.80 0.78/0.57 -0.89/0.78 0.75/0.51
IV. Analysis'
Table 1: Civil-State Party
6
1
For the third year running, Data Table 1 provides the second
most reliable evidence of ideological bias on the Court62 - and the
evidence all points in a single direction. In a dramatic reversal of two
years of liberal movement, the Court (without statistical exception)
reversed course from the 2003 Term, voting 27 points more conserva-
tively in the outcome of Majority Cases, 16.7 points more conserva-
tively in Split Cases and 45.7 points more conservatively in Unani-
mous Cases. Similarly dramatic conservative movement is displayed
60. Throughout Section IV, a footnote will list the cases tabulated on Tables 1-10. An
asterisk ("*") following a case citation indicates that it appears more than once on Tables
1 through 9. All cases on Table 10, except for one, appeared at least once on Tables 1
through 9. (Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465 (2004), appears only on Table 10.) A
"slashed Y" (" * ") following a case citation indicates that more than one voting pattern
was tabulated for the case. See Appendix A ("A case is included more than once on the
same table if it raises two or more distinct issues affecting the outcome of the case and the
issues are resolved by different voting alignments"). When more than one voting pattern
is tabulated for a case, a number - followed by an "x" - will follow the case citation. (For
example, "2x" means that two voting patterns were tabulated for the case." Because more
than one voting pattern may be tabulated, some cases reflect both "liberal" and "conserva-
tive" outcomes on different issues. Not every case decided by the Court is included on
Tables 1-10. If a case does not involve the federal or state government, or has governmen-
tal entities on both sides, it may not be included on Tables 1-4. See Appendix A (defini-
tions). Cases are included on Tables 5-9 only when they involve questions involving the
subject matter of those Tables (First Amendment, Equal Protection, Statutory Civil
Rights, Jurisdiction and Federalism questions). Id. Table 10 tabulates the outcome of all
cases decided by a single vote. Id. As a result of this classification scheme, not every Su-
preme Court opinion is included in this Study. For 2004, the following cases did not fall
within the Study's established parameters: Virginia v. Maryland, 540 U.S. 56 (2003);
Olympic Airways v. Husain, 540 U.S. 644 (2004); Yates v. Hendon, 541 U.S. 1 (2004); S.
Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95 (2004); Cent. Labor-
ers' Pension Fund v. Heinz, 541 U.S. 739 (2004); F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran
S. A., 542 U.S. 155 (2004).
61. San Diego v. Roe, 125 S. Ct. 521,* Brosseau v. Haugen, 125 S. Ct. 596 (2004),
Muehler v. Mena, 125 S. Ct. 1465 (2005), Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams, 125 S. Ct.
1453,* City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. (2005), 125 S. Ct. 1478, Smith v.
City of Jackson, 125 S. Ct. 1536 (2005),*' Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 125 S. Ct. 2074
(2005), Clingman v. Beaver, 125 S. Ct. 2029,* San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City and County of
San Francisco, 125 S. Ct. 2491 (2005),* American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. Michigan Pub.
Serv. Comm'n, 125 S. Ct. 2419 (2005),* Mid-Con Freight Systems, Inc. v. Michigan Pub.
Serv. Comm'n, 125 S. Ct. 2427 (2005),* Kelo v. New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, Van Orden
v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854 (2005), Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. 2796 (2005), Jackson v.
Birmingham Bd. of Ed., 125 S. Ct. 1497 (2005),* Granholm v. Heald, 125 S. Ct. 1885
(2005),* Cutter v. Wilkinson, 125 S. Ct. 2113 (2005),* McCreary County v. American Civil
Liberties Union of Ky., 125 S. Ct. 2722 (2005).
62. See 2003 Study, supra note 1, at 819.
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in the voting patterns of the individual Justices and in the statistical
tests (such as anticipated voting behaviors) employed by this Study.
The voting behavior of all nine Members of the Court on Table 1
departed in a statistically significant manner from past behavior.63
Moreover, the behavior of all nine Members was more conservative
in 2004 than in 2003. 4 Except for Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
O'Connor (who both voted somewhat more conservatively in the
1996 Term than this year), Table 1 reflects the most conservative vot-
ing patterns scored by any Member of the Court since 1995.6 In fact,
since the 1988 Term, only three Justices (the late Chief Justice in 1996
and 1990, Justice O'Connor in 1996 and Justice Souter in 1990) have
ever charted scores more conservative than those noted this Term.6
The unusual nature of this conservative movement is further evi-
denced in the error between anticipated and actual voting behaviors
for the 2004 Term.6' For the last two Terms, ARIMA forecasting has
produced reasonably accurate anticipated voting behaviors on Table
1 for the individual Justices and the Court as a whole. In 2002, the
Study anticipated the actual voting behavior of five Justices within 10
points and the remaining four Justices within 21 pointsi8 Last Term,
the actual behavior of four Members was within 10 points of their an-
ticipated scores, with the remaining five Members voting within 20
points of their anticipated scores. 9 This Term, by contrast, only one
Member of the Court (Justice Ginsburg) voted within 10 points of her
anticipated score, with two others (Justices Stevens and Souter) vot-
ing within 20 points of their anticipated scores."
Strong individual movements by the Justices naturally resulted in
conservative outcomes with regard to other statistical measures. The
outcome of Majority Cases was 23.2 points more conservative than
anticipated.71 This is the most conservative Majority outcome for the
63. See infra Mean Table 1.
64. See infra Data Table 1.
65. See infra Data Table 1.
66. See infra Data Table 1 (Chief Justice Rehnquist in 1996, Justice O'Connor in
1996). See 1995 Study, supra note 1, at 13 (Data Table 1 in the 1995 study shows that Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justice Souter both voted more conservatively in the 1990 Term
than they did this Term).
67. See supra/infra Data Table 1.
68. See 2002 Study, supra note 1, at 523 (Data Table 1).
69. See 2003 Study, supra note 1, at 782 (Data Table 1).
70. See infra Data Table 1.
71. See infra Data Table 1.
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Court since the 1988 Term. As for positioning, Justice Stevens
maintains his position as the most liberal Justice on Table 1, a distinc-
tion he has held eight of the last ten Terms.73 Justice Thomas re-
gained the position as the most conservative Justice on the Court in
State Civil Cases, a position he has held or shared for seven of the last
ten Terms.74
Unanticipated voting outcomes, like those on Table 1, challenge
analysts (including us) to provide "an explanation." In recent Stud-
ies, we have opined that unanticipated voting movements may reflect
judicial "pole-switching" (where a politically appealing regulatory re-
gime persuades generally liberal Justices to vote conservatively in fa-
vor the government, while generally conservative Justices react in the
opposite manner). In 2002, for example, "pole-switching" provided at
least a partial explanation for the "conservative" ranking of tradition-
ally liberal Justices on Table L" But, while one case this Term may
have involved "pole-switching," 71 this phenomenon does not account
for the consistent (and significant) liberal movements on Table 1:
unlike 2002, for example, both the traditionally liberal and conserva-
tive blocs voted more conservatively than in the past.77 This data does
not suggest that the voting patterns on Table 1 are the result of "pole-
switching." Something more basic (and straightforward) seems to be
involved.
The explanation for the voting movements on Table 1 may be as
simple as this: the Supreme Court in 2004 favored state governments
72. See infra Data Table 1. See 1995 Study, supra note 1, at 13 (Data Table 1 in 1995
shows the results of the Majority outcome since 1988). As Data Table 1 shows also, the
court was nearly as conservative in 1996.
73. See infra Data Table 1 (In 2002 there was "pole-switching" that resulted in a much
more "conservative" vote from Justice Stevens. In the 2000 Term, Justice Breyer took the
most liberal position and Justice Stevens was in the second most liberal position).
74. See infra Data Table 1 (Justice Thomas shared the most conservative position on
the court in the 2001, 2000, 1998, and 1997 Terms. He held the position by himself in the
1995, 2002, and 2004 Terms).
75. See 2003 Study, supra note 1, at 793.
76. For example, in Kelo v. New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, the traditionally liberal jus-
tices (Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer, joined by Justice Kennedy) voted "conserva-
tively" in favor of the government's action, while the conservatives (Rehnquist, O'Connor,
Scalia, Thomas) voted "liberally" against it out of a concern for private property rights.
See 2002 Study, supra note 1, at 510-511 (explaining the unexpected rankings on Data Ta-
ble 1); see also 2003 Study, supra note 1, at 792-94 (Data Table 1 discussion and explana-
tion of the 2002 Term outcome).
77. See infra Data Table 1 (in 2002, when the traditionally liberal block - Justices
Souter, Ginsburg, and Stevens - voted conservatively, the traditional conservatives -Jus-
tices Kennedy, Scalia and Chief Justice Rehnquist - voted relatively liberally).
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in civil cases more often than not. There may also be a somewhat
more sophisticated (but speculative) explanation for the movement
on Table 1. The "conservative sweep" on Table 1 in 2004 brings the
outcome of state civil cases more "in line" with the outcome of fed-
eral civil litigation on Table 2. The movement on Table 1 this Term,
therefore, may suggest that state governments are doing a better job
of representing their interests before the Nation's High Court than in
the recent past (in 2002, state governments won only 52% of their
cases, while in 2003 the figure was 46.7 %).
Data Table 2: Civil Cases - Federal Government versus a Private Party"'
Data Table 2 does not reveal any startling development. It does
not, for example, reflect the "sea change" movements shown on Ta-
ble 1. Despite conservative gains in the outcome of Unanimous
Cases, the Table reflects slight liberal movement in the outcome of
Split Cases; opinions that are presumably more influenced by ideo-
logical bias than Unanimous Cases. The Table also reflects slight lib-
eral movement in the outcome of Majority Cases.
The outcome of Unanimous Cases was conservative; the federal
government won 100% of these cases (an increase of 8.3 points from
last Term). This conservative movement was countered by liberal
movement in the outcome of Majority Cases (4.2 points) and Split
Cases (6.7 points). Considered as a whole, the outcomes on Table 2
are slightly liberal," with six of the nine Justices voting more liberally
in 2004 than in 2003 (the Chief Justice and Justices Stevens,
O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy and Souter).80
Five of the Justices exhibited statistically significant voting be-
havior this Term on Table 2.81 Of those five, three top the chart as the
most conservative Members of the Court: Justices Breyer, Thomas
78. Commissioner v. Banks, 125 S. Ct. 826 (2005), Tenet v. Doe, 125 S. Ct. 1230
(2005), Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Assn., 125 S. Ct. 2055,* Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S.
Ct. 2195,* Orff v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 2606 (2005), National Cable and Telecommuni-
cations Assn. v. Brand X Internet Services, 125 S. Ct. 2688 (2005), Ballard v. Commis-
sioner, 125 S. Ct. 1270 (2005), Graham County Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v. United
States ex rel. Wilson, 125 S. Ct. 2444 (2005).
79. Compare outcomes for Majority, Split and Unanimous Cass on Tables 1 and 2
(except in outcome of Unanimous cases, governmental success rates are within 7 points of
each other).
80. Factor analysis does not suggest that Table 2 provides highly reliable evidence of
ideological bias this Term. See infra Factor Analysis (Data Table 2 - Civil cases involving
the Federal Government as party - ranked in eighth place this year for reliability with a
score of -0.218).
81. See infra Mean Table 2 (Justices Breyer, Thomas, Ginsburg, Stevens and Souter).
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and Ginsburg."' They were also the only Justices who did not vote
more liberally this Term than in 2003.83
Justice Breyer is the most conservative Justice in Federal Civil
Cases, a position he shared in the 2003 and 1999 Terms and held
alone in 1996. 8' Justice Souter held the most liberal position on the
court this Term, a position he has never held since joining the Court
in 1990.' Next Term, ARIMA analysis anticipates that Justice Breyer
will again hold the conservative top of Table 2, while Justice Scalia
(contrary to what some might expect) is anticipated to be the most
liberal of the Justices.86
The voting blocs described above are one of the most interesting
features of Table 2 in 2004. The four most conservative Justices are
Justices Breyer, Thomas, Ginsburg and the late Chief Justice.' After
these "liberal" four, Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Scalia and Kennedy
cast 62.5% of their votes for the government, with Justice Souter -
the most "liberal" Member of the Court - voting for the federal gov-
ernment only half the time. 8
Last Term's Study emphasized the rather consistent conservative
nature of the Court in Federal Civil Cases.89 Those observations still
hold true: since 1995 there have only been 10 instances where any Jus-
tice has voted less than 50% of the time for the federal government
(half of those coming in 1997 alone). 90 The Majority has voted for the
government at least 50% of the time in eight of the last ten Terms.91
There have only been three instances since 1995 that the Court has de-
cided Split Cases less than 50% of the time for the government.'
The voting behavior of the Court anticipated by the 2003 Study
was quite accurate. All of the Justices' actual voting patterns this
Term fell within ten points of anticipated behavior; six voted within
82. See infra Data Table 2.
83. See infra Data Table 2.
84. See infra Data Table 2 (In 1999 Justice Breyer shared the most conservative posi-
tion with Chief Justice Rehnquist at 70% Votes for the Government).
85. See infra Data Table 2. See also 1995 Study, supra note 1, at 14 (Data Table 2
shows the votes back to when Justice Souter came on the court).
86. See infra Data Table 2.
87. See infra Data Table 2.
88. See infra Data Table 2.
89. See 2003 Study, supra note 1, at 794-95 (discussing the conservative strength of the
court for this category).
90. See 2003 Study, supra note 1, at 795 n.57.
91. See infra Data Table 2 (the 1997, and 2000 Terms are the only two Terms below
50%).
92. See infra Data Table 2 (the 1997, 1999, and 2000 Terms).
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five points of the 2003 ARIMA calculations.93 The outcome of Major-
ity Cases was within 4.2 points of the anticipated score. 4
Data Table 3: Criminal Cases - State Government versus a Private
Party9,
This Table, according to factor analysis, provides the most reli-
able evidence of conservative or liberal bias on the Court this Term. 96
This Table shows clear liberal movement. This liberal shift counter-
acts the conservative trend that has dominated Table 3 since the 2001
Term.'
Despite the liberal shift, the voting patterns on Table 3 were still
reasonably well anticipated by the 2003 Study, with six of the Justices'
anticipated scores falling within ten points of their actual score. 98
Even the Majority outcome was within 10 points of the predicted
score.' Only four of the Justices evidenced statistically significant
changes in their voting behavior this Term,"° and (not surprisingly)
three of those Justices voted outside their anticipated score by 10 or
more points."9 The only Justice's score that was not anticipated within
10 points and that also did not depart in a statistically significant
manner from prior voting behavior was Justice Ginsburg, whose vot-
ing behavior in 2003 was anticipated to be 12 points more conserva-
93. See infra Data Table 2.
94. See infra Data Table 2.
95. Kowalski v. Tesmer, 125 S. Ct. 564 (2004),* Devenpeck v. Alford, 125 S. Ct. 588
(2004), Florida v. Nixon, 125 S. Ct. 551 (2004), Illinois v. Caballes, 125 S. Ct. 834 (2005),
Bell v. Cone, 125 S. Ct. 847 (2005), Johnson v. California, 125 S. Ct. 1141,*' Brown v.
Payton, 125 S. Ct. 1432 (2005), Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 125 S. Ct. 1807 (2005),* Bradshaw v.
Stumpf, 125 S. Ct. 2398 (2005),' Wilkinson v. Austin, 125 S. Ct. 2384 (2005), Gonzalez v.
Crosby, 125 S. Ct. 2641 (2005), * Mayle v. Felix, 125 S. Ct. 2562 (2005), Bell v. Thompson,
125 S. Ct. 2825 (2005), Smith v. Texas, 125 S. Ct. 400 (2004), Smith v. Massachusetts, 125 S.
Ct. 1129 (2005), Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005), Wilkinson v. Dotson, 125 . Ct.
1242 (2005),* Rhines v. Weber, 125 S. Ct. 1528 (2005),* Deck v. Missouri, 125 S. Ct. 2007
(2005), Johnson v. California, 125 S. Ct. 2410,* Miller-El v. Dretke, 125 S. Ct. 2317
(2005),* Rompilla v. Beard, 125 S. Ct. 2456 (2005), Halbert v. Michigan, 125 S. Ct. 2582
(2005).*
96. See infra Factor Analysis (Criminal State Cases rank highest on the chart with a
score of -0.854).
97. See 2003 Study, supra note 1, at 796 (Data Table 3 analysis in the 2003 Study
spoke of the "continuing and significant conservative trend on the Court.").
98. See infra Data Table 3.
99. See infra Data Table 3.
100. See infra Mean Table 3.
101. See infra Data Table 3 (Chief Justice Rehnquist -10.0, Justice Souter -11.8, and
Justice Breyer - 15.4).
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tive than her actual 2004 voting tally of 34.6%.'02
Other individual scores worth noting were Justices Stevens,
Thomas, and Kennedy, whose voting behaviors were all anticipated
within four points of their actual behavior.' 3 Justice Thomas led the
conservative bloc again this Term with a slightly more conservative
voting pattern than last Term.'O° Justice Thomas has held the most
conservative position Table 3 for nine of the last ten Terms.0 " Jus-
tices Souter and Stevens tied for the most liberal position in State
Criminal Cases this Term.' 6 Justice Souter has shared this position
twice in the past-both times, as here, with Justice Stevens. 7 Justice
Stevens has been in the most liberal position eight of the last ten
years in this category.' 08
Table 3 suggests some notable voting patterns by the Court and
individual Justices. For the Court as a whole, Table 3 suggests liberal
movement. Although the trend is not quite as overwhelming as the
movement on Data Table 1,'09 there is clear liberal movement in the
outcome of Majority, Split, and Unanimous Cases."0 In Majority
Cases, the Court voted 13 points more liberally than last Term,"'
while Split Cases made an 18-point liberal jump. 1 2 There were nearly
the same number of issues tabulated on Table 3 in 2004 as in 2003,
and five of the nine Justices cast almost identical voting patterns in
both Terms."3 The liberal movement in 2004 appears to result from
the voting patterns of the late Chief Justice, retired Justice O'Connor
102. See infra Data Table 3. Justice Ginsburg actually voted nearly precisely her
"Mean Voting Percentage" for All Prior Terms, missing it by only .22. See infra Mean Ta-
ble 3.
103. See infra Data Table 3.
104. See infra Data Table 3 (Justice Thomas voted 80.0 last Term and 80.8 this Term).
105. See infra Data Table 3 (Justice Thomas held the position alone in 1997-98, 2002-
04. He failed to be the most conservative in 1999 when that position was held solely by
Justice Rehnquist).
106. See infra Data Table 3.
107. See infra Data Table 3 (Justice Souter shared the most liberal position in 1999
with Justice Stevens, and in 1995 he shared it with both Justice Stevens and Justice
Breyer).
108. See infra Data Table 3.
109. See supra Discussion of Data Table 1.
110. See infra Data Table 3.
111. See infra Data Table 3.
112. See infra Data Table 3.
113. See 2003 Study, supra note 1, at 784 (Data Table 3 shows that there were 27 issues
decided in Criminal State cases by the Court). See infra Data Table 3 (Shows that this
Term there were 26 issues decided by the Court and that Justices Thomas, Scalia, Ken-
nedy, Breyer, and Ginsburg more or less voted the same as they did last Term).
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and Justices Stevens and Souter.
Chief Justice Rehnquist "took no part in the decision" of eight
cases this Term, six of which were in this category." 4 However, it is
doubtful that his absence had a significant impact on the outcome of
the cases (because - even without his participation - all of these cases
were decided by five or more votes.)1 '5 Justice Stevens moved nearly
nine points in a liberal direction on Table 3, while Justice Souter evi-
denced the most prominent liberal movement of 16.9 points.16 But,
while the votes cast by the foregoing Justices obviously had some ef-
fect on the 13-point liberal movement in the outcome of Majority
Cases, much of the trend may be attributable to Justice O'Connor's
15.4-point liberal change of direction."7
The 2003 Study explained the significance of the "O'Connor fac-
tor" on Table 3, stating that: "it appears that as goes Justice
O'Connor, so goes the Court in the disposition of State/Criminal
Cases."'"8 As can be seen in the data on Table 3 across time, Justice
O'Connor's vote has been the most reliable indicator of the outcome
in Majority Cases on Table 3 for eight of the last ten Terms." 9 In
seven of those Terms, Justice O'Connor's voting percentage was
within four points of the outcome in Majority Cases.2 1 It is therefore
no surprise that a 15.4-point liberal movement by Justice O'Connor
resulted in a similar 13-point liberal movement in the results of Ma-
jority Cases. Accordingly, the ideological stance of Justice
O'Connor's replacement could have a significant impact indeed in the
outcome of State Criminal Cases.
Even though the outcome in Majority Cases moved more liber-
ally this Term, the Court still maintained its long tradition of voting at
least 50% of the time for the government. 121 The last time the Court
114. Devenpeck v. Alford, 125 S. Ct. 588 (2004), Florida v. Nixon, 125 S. Ct. 551
(2004), Illinois v. Caballes, 125 S. Ct. 834 (2005), Commissioner v. Banks, 125 S. Ct. 826
(2005), Johnson v. California(23), 125 S. Ct. 1141 (2005), Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma v.
Leavitt, 125 S. Ct. 1172 (2005), Shepard v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 1254 (2005), Brown v.
Payton, 125 S. Ct. 1432, Smith v. City of Jackson, 125 S. Ct. 1536 (2005), Small v. United
States, 125 S. Ct. 1752 (2005).
115. Devenpeck, Nixon, Banks, and Cherokee Nation were all unanimous decisions,
and Caballes was 6-2 in favor of government. The rest already had the necessary five
votes.
116. See infra Data Table 3.
117. See infra Data Table 3.
118. See 2003 Study, supra note 1, at 798.
119. See infra Data Table 3 (1996-2002, 2004).
120. See infra Data Table 3 (1996-98, 2000-02, 2004).
121. See infra Data Table 3.
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voted less than 50% of the time for the government in the outcome of
Majority Cases on Table 2 was in the 1991 Term, when it voted for
the state only 44.4% of the time."' State Criminal Cases, like Federal
Civil Cases, tends to be a category where the Court heavily favors the
government.1 23 But, unlike the voting patterns displayed on Table 2's
tabulation of Federal Civil Cases, Table 3's tabulations show a some-
what wider range between the voting behaviors tallied by the individ-
ual Justices over time,24 This may be one reason that Table 3 tends to
provide rather reliable evidence of bias. For the last 10 years, more-
over, Table 3 has evidenced clearly identifiable bloc voting, with the
most conservative Justices retaining Justice O'Connor's vote most of
the time.
125




Federal Criminal Cases dropped from providing the third most
reliable evidence of ideological bias in 2004 to fourth this Term.
12
1
The movement indicated on the Table from the previous Term is
clearly liberal.
On the individual level, seven of the nine Justices demonstrated
statistically significant changes in their voting behavior this Term.',
Nevertheless, the voting behaviors of many Justices were still rather
accurately anticipated by the 2003 Study, with five Justices' actual
scores falling within 10 points of their anticipated outcomes129
122. See infra Data Table 3. See also 1995 Study, supra note 1, at 15 (Data Table 3 con-
tinues this Term's Table from 1995 back to 1988).
123. See supra discussion of the Civil Federal Cases and the amount of votes for the
government.
124. Compare Data Tables 2 and 3. As stated in the discussion regarding Data Table
2, Justices rarely vote less than 50% of the time for the government on Table 3.
125. See infra Data Table 3.
126. Whitfield v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 687 (2005), United States v. Booker, 125 S.
Ct. 738 (2005), * Jama v. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 125 S. Ct. 694 (2005),
Johnson v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 1571 (2005),*Pasquantino v. United States, 125 S. Ct.
1766 (2005), Dodd v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 2478 (2005), Leocal v. Ashcroft, 125 S. Ct.
377 (2004), Clark v. Martinez, 125 S. Ct. 716 (2005), Shepard v. United States, 125 S. Ct.
1254 (2005), Small v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 1752 (2005), Arthur Andersen LLP v.
United States, 125 S. Ct. 2129 (2005).
127. See 2003 Study, supra note 1, 813-14 (Section V); see also Section V below show-
ing this year's ranking.
128. See infra Mean Table 4 (Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy are the only
Justices whose vote was not statistically significant).
129. See infra Data Table 4 (Chief Justice Rehnquist 7.1, and Justices O'Connor -2.4,
Kennedy 0.6, Breyer -0.5, and Stevens -4.1).
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Perhaps the most interesting voting behavior of any Justice on
Table 4 this Term was that of Justice Scalia - who made a rather dra-
matic liberal jump. 13° Not only was his movement from the previous
Term significant in terms of raw points (39.2), but his voting pattern
was far and away the most unanticipated (43.5 points more liberal
than expected). 3' Typically, one might assume that a Justice's dra-
matic departure from a prior Term's voting behavior would necessar-
ily result in a similarly substantial departure from the Justice's antici-
pated voting behavior, but this is not always true. This Term, for
example, Justice Ginsburg made the identical liberal point movement
as Justice Scalia (39.2), but her actual voting behavior deviated only
16.6 points from her anticipated score.'32 As a result, Justice Scalia's
movement this Term appears to be more notable.
While both Justice Scalia's and Ginsburg's departures from prior
behavior on Table 4 were statistically significant, the movement of
Justice Scalia - as shown by the dramatic difference between his an-
ticipated and actual voting behaviors - may well have more import
than the movement of Justice Ginsburg.33 The substantial quantita-
tive evidence of liberal movement in Justice Scalia's voting behavior
on Table 4 this Term may also have practical significance for Su-
preme Court practitioners and scholars. For one thing, the results on
Table 4 may suggest the presence of some "qualitative theme" run-
ning through the Court's Criminal Federal Cases in 2004 that resulted
in Justice Scalia's unusual voting behavior;"3 the Justice's most liberal
voting pattern since the Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly has
130. See infra Data Table 4.
131. See infra Data Table 4.
132. See infra Data Table 4.
133. See infra Mean Table 4 and Data Table 4.
134. See Graham County Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v. United States ex rel. Wil-
son, 125 S. Ct. 2444 (2005), National Cable and Telecommunications Assn. v. Brand X
Internet Services, 125 S. Ct. 2688 (2005), Pasquantino v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 1766
(2005), Johnson v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 1571 (2005), Shepard v. United States, 125 S.
Ct. 1254 (2005), Clark v. Martinez, 125 S. Ct. 716 (2005), United States v. Booker, 125 S.
Ct. 738 (2005). Because this Study undertakes a quantitative rather than a qualitative
analysis of voting behavior, we have not attempted to identify in this Study a convincing
"over-arching explanation" for Justice Scalia's unusually liberal voting pattern this Term.
We note, however, one possibility. As a "strict constructionist" who believes in (and en-
forces) both rules and the plain meaning of words, Justice Scalia may be applying "conser-
vative" judicial norms to the decision of Federal Criminal Cases in a manner that produces
"liberal" outcomes. If so, Justice Scalia's performance on Table 4 may not represent a
significant reorientation in his judicial philosophy, but rather consistent adherence to that
philosophy.
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published this Study."'
Other individual scores of interest include those of the late Chief
Justice, who in his final Term, again held the most conservative posi-
tion on the Court - voting for the Federal government in 72.7% of
Federal Criminal Cases. 36 Chief Justice Rehnquist held this position
from 2001 until his final Term. 13 7 Last Term, the Chief Justice shared
the position with Justice Thomas. Justice Thomas, however, as with
Justice Scalia, demonstrated a remarkably liberal voting pattern this
Term, voting against the federal government 36.2 points more often
than in 2003.138 The most liberal position this Term was shared by
Justices Stevens, Souter and Ginsburg, who each voted for the federal
government in only 15.4% of the cases.139
As a whole, the Court evidenced rather significant liberal move-
ment away from last Term's conservative marks.'" The outcome of
Majority Cases moved 26.5 points in a liberal direction, while the out-
come of Split Cases dropped from complete victory last Term to gov-
ernment success in 55.6% of the Split Cases on Table 4 this year.
Even the outcome in Unanimous Cases moved liberally, from 57.1%
in 2003 to 25% in 2004 - a 27.1-point drop in support for the federal
141government.
The outcome on Table 4 continues the erratic behavior that has
persisted on the Court in Federal Criminal Cases since 1999.142 Since
that Term, the average difference between Terms has been 45.99
points."' Compare this rather sizeable variation with the average dif-
ference during the 1995-1999 Terms, which was only 9.03 points."
Similar unsteadiness in the Court's decision of Federal Criminal
135. See infra Data Table 4; see also 1995 Study, supra note 1, at 16 (Data Table 4
shows Scalia's history back to the 1988 Term).
136. See infra Data Table 4.
137. See infra Data Table 4.
138. See infra Data Table 4. This liberal movement by Justice Thomas who, like Jus-
tice Scalia, is known as a strict constructionist, may support the inference that some com-
mon element in the cases on Table 4 this Term produced "liberal" voting behavior by
"conservative" jurists. See supra, note 131.
139. See infra Data Table 4.
140. See infra Data Table 4.
141. See infra Data Table 4.
142. See infra Chart 4; see also infra Data Table 4.
143. This was calculated by taking the average of the absolute value of the differences
between Terms beginning with the difference between the 1999 and 2000 Terms (25.90)
and including the difference between the 2003 and 2004 Terms (26.58). See infra Data Ta-
ble 4 for the numbers used to calculate.
144. Calculated the same as was described in the previous footnote.
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Cases since 1999 is also seen in the outcome of Majority, Split, and
Unanimous Cases over time. Beginning with the 1988 Term and con-
tinuing 1999, the Court had never voted for the federal government in
Majority or Split Cases less than 50% of the time.145 During the same
twelve-year time span, only one Term (1989) produced less than 50%
victory for the federal government in the outcome of Unanimous
Cases' 6 However, in the five years since 1999, including the 2000
through 2004 Terms, the outcomes in Majority, Split, and Unanimous
Cases have fallen below 50% in favor of the federal government
seven times.
47
This recent fluctuation in the outcome of Federal Criminal Cases
could arise from a number of factors. This quantitative Study, fur-
thermore, does not attempt to ascertain irrefutable explanations for
the possible causes of unusual outcomes, such as those on Table 4.
The Study demonstrates beyond question, however, that the federal
government's record of success on Table 5 has wavered significantly
since 2000, at least when compared with prior outcomes on Table 5
shown by this Study.
148
Nevertheless, and while the following assertions are speculative
and cannot be "proven" by review of this Study's statistics, the federal
government's uneven record of victory in criminal cases since the
2000 Term may indicate: (a) that the Court does not support the posi-
tion of the current Administration in criminal cases as consistently as
it did the position of the prior Administration (similar to this Study's
suggestion, more than a decade ago, that the Clinton Administration
fared somewhat poorly during its initial appearances before the
Court, with performance improving as the Administration gained
more experience in bringing cases before the Court); 149 (b) that the
Court may indeed be moving - albeit in fits and starts - toward a
more liberal stance in Federal Criminal Cases, or (c) simply that the
quality of the government's advocacy efforts (or its decisions regard-
ing which criminal matters to pursue vigorously on appeal) has been
uneven.
145. See infra Data Table 4. See 1995 Study, supra note 1, at 16 (Data Table 4 shows
history of study back to 1988 Term).
146. See infra Data Table 4. See 1995 Study, supra note 1, at 16 (Data Table 4 that in
1989 the cases unanimous cases were decided in favor of the government on 33% of the
time).
147. See infra Data Table 4.
148. See supra p. 2.
149. See 1994 Study at 3; 1995 Study at note 32 at 8 and 26; 1996 Study note 41 at 41.
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Data Table 5: First Amendment Cases - Rights of Expression,
Association, and Religion"'
This Table shows conservative movement from the previous
Term."' This movement reverses the brief liberal movement noted
last Term. 152 But, as was also stated last Term: "Any forecast of the
future course of First Amendment law ... seems problematic. '
Last Term there were only seven issues counted on this table, 4 and
this Term there were only four.'55 Nevertheless, Table 5 presents
some information of possible note.
Last year's Study emphasized Justice Thomas' position as the
most liberal Justice on First Amendment issues; a voting position with
which he was quite familiar.5 6 This Term, however, Justice Thomas -
whose mean voting average on First Amendment issues over time has
favored the claim 55.3% of the time - tallied a statistically significant
change in voting behavior, moving to the most conservative position
possible: zero votes for the claim. "7 Justice Stevens was the most lib-
eral Justice on First Amendment issues in 2004, a position he also
achieved in the 2001 and 2002 Terms.
5 8
ARIMA analysis did not anticipate voting behaviors on Table 5
with great accuracy.19  This result is unexceptionable, in light of the
few First Amendment issues addressed by the Court over time. In
fact, the only category of cases in this Study with a larger "99% Con-
fidence Interval for True Mean" is Table 6, Equal Protection Cases."6
Five Justices' scores were statistically significant this Term. 6' As
for correlations, last Term's study noted that the First Amendment
150. San Diego v. Roe, 125 S. Ct. 521 (2005),* Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Assn.,
125 S. Ct. 2055 (2005),* Clingman v. Beaver, 125 S. Ct. 2029,* Tory v. Cochran, 125 S. Ct.
2108 (2005).*
151. See infra Section V discussion of Factor Analysis and ranking.
152. See 2003 Study, supra note 1, at 800-02 (Data Table 5 analysis).
153. See 2003 Study, supra note 1, at 800 (Data Table 5 comment 1st paragraph).
154. See 2003 Study, supra note 1, at 786 (Data Table 5).
155. See infra Data Table 5.
156. See 2003 Study, supra note 1, at 801-02 (First Amendment analysis states that "in
the ten Terms since 1994, Justice Thomas has held the first or second most liberal spot on
First Amendment issues eight times.").
157. See infra Mean Table 5. In Tory v. Cochran, 125 S. Ct. 2108 (2005), both Justice
Thomas and Justice Scalia declined to address the First Amendment issue.
159. See infra Data Table S.
159. See infra Data Table 5 (only three scores within 10 points of anticipations).
160. See infra Mean Tables 1-10 (this assertion is based on the average of the absolute
values of the "99% Confidence Interval for True Mean" columns for each Mean Table).
161. See infra Mean Table 5 (Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Scalia, Souter, and Thomas).
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voting behaviors of Justices Stevens and Ginsburg were more closely
correlated than the behaviors of Justices Scalia and Thomas.16 ' How-
ever, that ranking has flipped this Term, with Justices Scalia and
Thomas sharing an R2 statistic of 0.87 and Justices Stevens and Gins-
burg dropping to a shared score of 0.80."
Data Table 6: Equal Protection Cases'6
The Court generally decides few, if any,' 65 equal protection cases
each Term, so it is not surprising that Table 6 has been, and remains,
the least reliable indicator of ideological bias on the Court,'66 as well
as one of the most volatile categories of cases analyzed by the Study.
Last Term, the Court decided one equal protection case, where it
unanimously favored the claim. Table 6 this Term tabulates the re-
sults of four cases, making it substantially less likely that 100% of
equal protection issues would be decided in favor of the claim. Ac-
cordingly, the Court's conservative movement of 25 points in the out-
come of Majority Cases is hardly unexpected.
What may be more noteworthy is the fact that, while the move-
ment in Majority Cases is "conservative," the Court nevertheless fa-
vored the claim - in four cases involving Split Decisions - 75% of the
time. ARIMA analysis anticipated conservative movement in 2004,
but movement rather more conservative than that which was actually
charted; the Court voted for the Equal Protection Claim 75% of the
time rather than the 48.5% score anticipated. Accordingly, both the
2003 and 2004 Terms suggest a liberal orientation for the Court on
Equal Protection Claims. Nevertheless, the wide range in outcomes
demonstrated on Table 6 over time, as well as Table 6's relatively
small statistical sample, precludes firm assertions regarding any
"ideological direction" of the Court on equal protection issues.
Several pairs of Justices demonstrate rather strongly correlated
voting behaviors on equal protection questions, particularly among
the most conservative (Justices Thomas and Scalia, R2=0.91) and most
liberal (Justices Breyer and Ginsburg R2 =0.97; Justices Souter and
Breyer, R 2=0.97; Justices Ginsburg and Souter, R2=1.00 - or perfect
162. See 2003 Study, supra note 1, at 802.
163. See infra Regression Table 5.
164. Miller-El v. Dretke, 125 S. Ct. 2317 (2005),* Halbert v. Michigan, 125 S. Ct. 2582
(2005),* Johnson v. California(57), 125 S. Ct. 2410 (2005),* Johnson v. California(23), 125
S. Ct. 1141 (2005).*
165. See 2003 Study, supra note 1, at 779 (one case); 2002 Study, supra note 1, at 507
(four cases); 2001 Study, supra note 1, at 316 (no cases). For more cases, see supra note 1.
166. See infra Chart 6.
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correlation). Two of the more moderate Members of the Court, Jus-
tices Kennedy and O'Connor, also exhibit rather closely correlated
voting patterns on Table 5, with an R2=0.88 and a Pearson correlation
coefficient of 0.94 (a somewhat less accurate measure of correlation
than the R2statistic).67
The alignment of the Court on Table 6 demonstrates bloc voting,
but suggests that a rather large liberal bloc - at least on Equal Protec-
tion Claims in 2004 - obtained control of the Court. Justice Stevens
voted for 100% of all Equal Protection Claims, while Justices
O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer voted for 75% of
such claims. The three most conservative members of the Court
voted substantially less often in favor of the claim, with the late Chief
Justice favoring precisely one-third of Equal Protection Claims, Jus-
tice Scalia voting for one-fourth (or 25%) of the claims, and Justice
Thomas rejecting all Equal Protection Claims. Accordingly, Table 6
suggests that the "core conservatives" (the late Chief Justice and Jus-
tices Scalia and Thomas) tend to vote rather conservatively on equal
protection issues, while the remaining Members of the Court are sig-
nificantly more receptive. The reliability of this inference, however,
is rather low, due to the fact that Table 6 (at least in a statistical sense,
where large samples provide greater reliability) has tabulated rela-
tively few equal protection votes for the individual Justices and the
Court over the course of the Study.
The actual voting behaviors of Justices Souter, Ginsburg and
Scalia were within three points of their anticipated voting scores. The
Study anticipates that the Court will continue to move in a conserva-
tive direction during the 2005 Term, with the Majority voting for
59.4% (rather than this Term's 75%) of the claims. However, due to
the volatility of Table 6 over time, voting behaviors on Equal Protec-
tion Claims are exceptionally difficult to anticipate with any accuracy.
Data Table 7: Statutory Civil Rights Claims16
Table 7 tabulates the results from only six cases, and accordingly
has somewhat questionable statistical reliability. Nevertheless, the
data on Table 7 suggest the possibility of a few rather interesting
trends.
The Court continued the liberal trend regarding Statutory Civil
167. See Appendix B, infra.
168. Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams, 125 S. Ct. 1453 (2005),* Wilkinson v. Dotson,*
125 S. Ct. 1242 (2005), Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Ed., 125 S. Ct. 1497 (2005),* Smith v.
City of Jackson, 125 S. Ct. 1536 (2005),* Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd., 125 S. Ct.
2169 (2005).
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Claims that began last Term, with the outcome in Majority and Split
Cases favoring these claims more often than at any other time during
the past decade.16' And, while Table 7 demonstrates what has become
"classic" conservative/liberal bloc voting on the Rehnquist Court, the
four liberal Justices controlled the outcomes tabulated on the Table.
In 2004, the Court's most liberal Members (Justices Stevens,
Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer) all voted in favor of five Statutory
Civil Rights Claims, rejecting only one such claim (a claim unani-
mously rejected by the Court).' 70 The remaining five Justices (who
have often comprised the Court's controlling conservative voting
bloc) charted rather more conservative voting patterns. The histori-
cal swing voters, Justices O'Connor and Kennedy, each cast their
votes for the claim twice and against the claim four times. The same
voting pattern was displayed by the traditionally conservative Justices
Scalia and Thomas. Chief Justice Rehnquist was the most conserva-
tive of these five Justices, favoring only one statutory civil rights claim
in 2004.
But, even though these five Justices rejected Statutory Civil
Rights Claims at least twice as often as they accepted them, their con-
servative voting patterns did not determine the overall outcome on
Table 7. Rather, it was the liberal four-member bloc that determined
the outcome of cases involving Statutory Civil Rights Claims, as each
of the five Justices with "conservative" voting behaviors joined (at
various times) the rather solid liberal bloc. As a result, the Court - by
Split Decisions - accepted five of the six claims on Table 7.
Table 7 demonstrates rather closely correlated voting behaviors
by two pairs of traditionally liberal Justices (Justices Breyer and Ste-
vens R2=0.96; Justices Ginsburg and Souter R2=0.94). As the 2003
Study anticipated, all four of these Justices voted for Statutory Civil
Rights Claims more than 50% of the time.171
The increasing homogeneity on the Court suggested by the vot-
ing patterns displayed in the 2003 Study172 was all but wiped out in
2004: the liberal Justices (Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg and
Breyer) all voted more liberally in 2004 than in 2003, while the re-
maining five Justices (the Chief Justice and Justices O'Connor, Ken-
nedy, Scalia and Thomas) voted more conservatively.17 3 Five of these
169. See infra Data Table 7, Chart 7.
170. Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams, 125 S. Ct. 1453 (2005)*.
171. See 2003 Study, supra note 1, at 788.
172. Id. at 803.
173. See infra Data Table 7.
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voting patterns (by the Chief Justice and Justices Souter, Ginsburg,
O'Connor and Kennedy) represented statistically significant depar-
tures from past behaviors.'
But, despite increased (rather than decreased) disparity between
the voting scores tallied by the "liberal" and "conservative" blocs on
the Court, the liberal movement beginning last Term (which the
Study attributed at least in part to lessening fragmentation among the
Justices) continued in 2004. These outcomes might suggest that,
while ideological tensions between the Justices have not lessened (as
suggested by last year's Study), the voting power of variously com-
posed liberal coalitions on the Court may have increased. The accu-
racy of this quantitative inference will be tested next Term. The 2004
Study anticipates a slight conservative move (less than two points) for
the Court as a whole in 2005. If, instead of slight conservative move-
ment in 2005, Table 7 demonstrates continued liberal movement, the
Court may well be in the process of ideological re-orientation on
Statutory Civil Rights cases.
Data Table 8: Cases Raising a Challenge to the Exercise of Federal
Jurisdiction
1 75
Although Table 8 shows some nominal "conservative" move-
ment in 2004 (in the outcome of Split and Unanimous Cases), the
data - considered as a whole - demonstrate continuation of the
Court's long-term liberal tendency to reject challenges to federal ju-
risdiction. Table 8, particularly when examined over time, suggests
that the Court favors federal jurisdiction more often than not and that
the Court's liberal stance is fairly stable. With the exception of 1999,
when an unusually high number of jurisdictional challenges were re-
jected, the outcomes of Majority Cases on Table 8 have fluctuated
within a relatively narrow range of 52.2% to 66.7 %.76
For 2004, the outcome in Majority Cases was identical to the
2003 Term, with the Court accepting 62.5 % of all claims favoring fed-
eral jurisdiction.177 And, despite a 3.9-point conservative movement
174. See infra Mean Table 7.
175. Kowalski v. Tesmer, 125 S. Ct. 564 (2004),* Howell v. Mississippi, 125 S. Ct. 856
(2005), San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City and County of San Francisco, 125 S. Ct. 2491
(2005),* Rhines v. Weber, 125 S. Ct. 1528 (2005),* Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic In-
dustries Corp., 125 S. Ct. 1517 (2005), Tory v. Cochran, 125 S. Ct. 2108 (2005),* Grable &
Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue Engineering & Mfg., 125 S. Ct. 2363 (2005), Exxon
Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Services, Inc., 125 S. Ct. 2611 (2005).
176. See id.
177. See infra Chart 8.
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in the outcome of Split Cases and a similar 13.3-point move in
Unanimous Cases, for the first time since 2001 every member of the
Court voted at last half of the time in 2004 to reject challenges to fed-
eral jurisdiction."' These relatively liberal individual voting patterns
of the Justices do not support the contention that Table 8, in 2004,
marks a "real" departure from the Court's historically liberal stance
regarding Federal jurisdictional matters.
For the second year in a row, '79 the voting behaviors anticipated
by the Study were fairly accurate, both for the individual Justices and
the Court as a whole (an outcome that may reinforce our observa-
tions regarding the Court's established liberal stance on jurisdictional
issues). The actual voting behavior of seven of the nine Justices (the
Chief Justice and Justices Souter, Kennedy, Ginsburg, Scalia, Thomas
and O'Connor) fell within eight points of their anticipated scores.
The outcome in Majority Cases in 2004, furthermore, was only one-
half point less liberal than anticipated by the Study in 2003.
The voting patterns of two Justices this Term are rather interest-
ing. The voting behavior of the late Chief Justice and Justice Breyer
seem to run counter to their supposed ideological leanings: Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist was the second most liberal Member of the court this
Term with regard to expanding federal jurisdiction, while Justice
Breyer was tied with Justice O'Connor as the Members of the Court
most likely to reject federal jurisdictional claims."' (The conservative
voting patterns of Justices Breyer and O'Connor are somewhat un-
usual when compared with their generally liberal stance on jurisdic-
tional issues in the recent past.)"8
Data Table 9: Federalism Cases ls3
Table 9 displaced Table 4 (Federal Criminal Cases) this Term as
the third most reliable indicator of ideological bias, as established by
178. See infra Data Table 8.
179. See 2003 Study, supra note 1, at 806 (five justices within 5 points of anticipated
behavior and all justices within 11,8 points).
180. See infra Data Table 8.
181. Id.
182. See 2003 Study, supra note 1, at 789 (Data Table 8); compare 2003/2004 scores on
Data Table 8, infra.
183. Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 125 S. Ct. 1788 (2005),' American Trucking
Assns., Inc. v. Michigan Pub. Serv, Comm'n, 125 S. Ct. 2419 (2005),* Mid-Con Freight Sys-
tems, Inc. v. Michigan Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 125 S. Ct. 2427 (2005),* Norfolk Southern R.
Co. v. James N. Kirby, Pty. Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 385 (2005), Granholm v. Heald, 125 S. Ct. 1885
(2005),* Cutter v. Wilkinson, 125 S. Ct. 2113 (2005),* Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195
(2005).*
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factor analysis."M The Court moved conservatively in deciding the
outcome of Majority Cases (eight points) and Split Cases (21.4
points), but moved 10 points in a liberal direction in the decision of
Unanimous Cases. Because of our assumption that ideology plays a
more significant role in the outcome of Split Cases than Unanimous
Cases,85 Table 9 suggests conservative movement (with the Court fa-
voring state rather than the federal government) in the decision of
federalism issues in 2004.
Interestingly enough, only three voting patterns emerged on Ta-
ble 9 for the 2004 term: four Justices ruled in favor of the state gov-
ernment 50% of the time (the Chief Justice and Justices Stevens,
O'Connor and Thomas); three Justices favored the state with 37.5%
of their federalism votes (Justices Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer);
while the most liberal two Justices - Justices Scalia and Kennedy - fa-
vored state over federal government in only 25% of the cases. This
unusual "three bloc pattern" on Table 9 is made even more interest-
ing by the fact that the generally liberal Justice Stevens joined the
"most conservative" bloc on federalism questions in 2004, while gen-
erally conservative Justice Scalia joined the "most liberal bloc." Ta-
ble 9, in fact, records Justice Stevens' highest support for state gov-
ernment in 10 years. '
ARIMA forecasting did not anticipate the voting behavior of in-
dividual Justices very accurately, as only Justice Souter's and Breyer's
actual voting behaviors fell within 10 points of their anticipated
scores. Nevertheless, the anticipated outcome in Majority Cases was
rather accurate; the 2003 Study anticipated the Court's 2004 outcome
within 4.2 points (ARIMA forecasting suggested that the Court's
overall behavior this Term would be 4.2 points less liberal than it was
in actual fact).'87
Despite the conservative movement in Majority and Split Cases
this Term, there are indications of the Court's emerging liberal incli-
nations on federalism issues. The Court rejected claims of state au-
thority in five instances, and ruled in favor of the state four times -
suggesting liberal movement in the overall outcome of the nine cases.
But numbers alone do not indicate the development of the federalism
case law. Three of the five federalism issues decided against state
184. See Section V, infra.
185. See supra notes 18 and 19 with accompanying text.
186. See infra Data Table 9.
187. Id.
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power involved unanimous decisions,"8 while only one federalism is-
sue was decided unanimously in favor of the state." Under the pre-
sumptions of this Study, these five unanimous outcomes are less likely
to be motivated by the ideological leanings of individual Justices.1'9
As a result, the primary indications of bias on Table 9 this Term
should be derived from an examination of the outcome of Split Cases
- where four federalism issues each were decided evenly between the
conflicting assertions of state and federal power: two cases for191 and
two cases against" state power.
As noted above, this outcome in Split Cases results in a 21.4-
point liberal movement from last Term. But whether the quantitative
increase in the Court's conservative support of the states signals in-
creased receptivity to assertions of state regulatory power is highly
questionable-particularly when one considers the nature of the is-
sues decided in favor of the states in split decisions during 2004, and
compares those cases with the nature of the issued involved in the
split decisions against the state.
Both split decisions favoring the state involved questions of pre-
emption, where the Court was hesitant to displace state authority on
the basis of somewhat ambiguous federal statutes.9 3 But, once be-
yond its hesitancy to displace state authority without a clear congres-
sional mandate, the Court seemed quite willing to limit state power in
188. See infra Data Table 8; The three cases with unanimous decisions against state
power were: Norfolk Southern R. Co. v. James N. Kirby, Pty. Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 385 (2005)
(holding that a transportation contract covering both sea and land travel was essentially a
maritime contract subject to federal law), Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 125 S. Ct. 1788
(2005)" (explaining that FIFRA pre-empted state tort claims under certain circumstances),
and Cutter v. Wilkinson, 125 S. Ct. 2113 (2005)* (reasoning that state safety and security
interests at prisons outweigh some prisoner's claim to religious accommodation; federal
provision constitutional, even though Ohio contended that it impermissibly restricted state
authority (see Thomas, J., dissenting)).
189. American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. Michigan Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 125 S. Ct. 2419
(2005)* (holding that a state fee imposed on trucks did not violate the dormant commerce
clause).
190. See supra at 105 (specifically the accompanying text, as well as footnotes 18 and
19).
191. Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 125 S. Ct. 1788 (2005),' Mid-Con Freight Sys-
tems, Inc. v. Michigan Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 125 S. Ct. 2427 (2005).*
192. Granholm v. Heald, 125 S. Ct. 1885 (2005),* Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195
(2005).*
193. Mid-Con Freight Systems, Inc. v. Michigan Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 125 S. Ct. 2427
(2005)* (holding that a state imposed trucking fee upheld under against dormant com-
merce clause attack in a companion cases was not preempted by federal registration re-
quirements); Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 125 S. Ct. 1788 (2005)' (holding that state
tort claims did not impose "labeling requirements" preempted by federal law).
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favor of federal regulatory authority. The two split decisions decided
against the state restricted state authority to regulate alcohol sales
over the internet" or allow limited, medical use of marijuana.1 95 Both
cases (at least viewed in light of recent decisions expanding state
regulatory power despite commerce clause objections1 ) seemingly
increased federal regulatory power under the commerce clause, with
the second case arguably stalling what some scholars had identified as
the Rehnquist Court's federalism-based "revival" of state regulatory
authority.1 97 Accordingly, the ostensible quantitative increase in the
Court's conservative support of state authority in 2004 may, in fact,
be insignificant. The 2004 Term's liberal revival of doctrinal restric-
tions on state power may well overshadow the quantitative conserva-
tive movement observed on Table 9..
194. In Granholm v. Heald, 125 S. Ct. 1885 (2005), the Court held that a state could not
tax direct sales of alcohol (such as wine purchased over the internet), without violating the
intent of the commerce clause.
195. In Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005), the court upheld congressional
power to regulate the use of marijuana under the commerce clause, invalidating state laws
allowing for medical or "compassionate" use.
196. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S.
598 (2000).
197. The court's decisions in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (2005), and United
States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2005), were implicated in Gonzales v. Raich. The major-
ity narrowed the scope of Lopez and Morrison largely by focusing upon and reviving a
post-Depression Era decision, Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) - a case whose rea-
soning had been undercut by the analysis of the two more recent opinions. Gonzales
seems to signal that a new voting coalition on the Court is rethinking the "revival" of state
regulatory authority within the federal system. Compare Jesse H. Choper, Taming Con-
gress' Power Under the Commerce Clause: What Does the Near Future Portend?, 55 Ark.
L. Rev. 731 (2003); Steven G. Calabresi, "Federalism and the Rehnquist Court: A Norma-
tive Defense," 574 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 24 (2001).
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Data Table 10: Swing-Vote Analysis: Who Votes Most Often With the
Majority in Close Cases? 98
Cases decided by a single vote (which most often involve 5-4 de-
cisions, but also include other circumstances where a change in a sin-
gle vote would alter the outcome, such as a 5-3 vote to reverse) fall
into the "swing vote" category and generally provide reliable evi-
dence of ideological trends on the Court.!9 Many editions of this
Study have demonstrated that Justices O'Connor and Kennedy have
tended to be the "leaders" in casting the decisive vote in closely di-
vided cases.2" In 2004, these two Justices, joined by Justice Souter,
tied as the "most influential Justices" during the 2004 Term, voting
61.9% of the time with the controlling majority in Swing-Vote Cases.
This outcome ends Justice O'Connor's three-year hold on the "most
influential Justice" position. With her retirement, ARIMA analysis
anticipates that - among the current Members of the Court - Justice
Thomas will take over the "most influential" position next Term.2°'
The Justices fit into four voting patterns on Table 10 this Term:
Justices O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter voted with the majority
61.9% of the time; Justices Stevens and Breyer joined 57.1% of the
controlling opinions in closely divided cases; Justices Scalia, Thomas
and Ginsburg voted with the majority 52.4% of the time; and the late
Chief Justice joined the controlling majority opinion in precisely half
of the Swing-Vote Cases. 2004 marks the first time in a decade that
every Justice voted with the majority in swing cases at least half the
202time.
198. Swing-vote cases reaching a conservative outcome: United States v. Booker, 125
S. Ct. 738 (2005),' Jama v. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 125 S. Ct. 694 (2005),
Brown v. Payton, 125 S. Ct. 1432 (2005), Johnson v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 1571 (2005),
Pasquantino v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 1766 (2005), Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 125 S. Ct. 1807
(2005), Dodd v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 2478 (2005), Kelo v. New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655
(2005), Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854 (2005), Bell v. Thompson, 125 S. Ct. 2825
(2005), Smith v. Massachusetts, 125 S. Ct. 1129 (2005), Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183
(2005), Shepard v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 1254 (2005), Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of
Ed., 125 S. Ct. 1497 (2005), Small v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 1752 (2005), Granholm v.
Heald, 125 S. Ct. 1885 (2005), Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2169
(2005), Rompilla v. Beard, 125 S. Ct. 2456 (2005), Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Ser-
vices, Inc., 125 S. Ct. 2611 (2005), McCreary County v. American Civil Liberties Union of
Ky., 125 S. Ct. 2722 (2005).
199. See 2003 Study, supra note 1, at 808,2002 Study, supra note 1, at 521.
200. See 2001 Study, supra note 1, at 318, 326, 331; 2000 Study, supra note 1, at 259;
1999 Study, supra note 1, at 605; 1998 Study, supra note 1, at 434, 489; 1997 Study, supra
note 1, at 597.
201. See infra Data Table 10.
202. Id.
[Vol. 32:4
For the first time in six Terms, the outcome of Swing-Vote Cases
was determined more often than not by a liberal voting bloc, 2 3 ending
a conservative streak which began in 1999. All of the Justices save
Justice Thomas showed statistically significant changes in their voting
behavior from last Term.2 ' But, despite these statistical departures
from past practice, ARIMA analysis was relatively accurate in antici-
pating the voting behavior of the individual Justices - within 10 points
for seven of the Justices (the Chief Justice and Justices Kennedy,
Souter, Breyer, Scalia, Thomas and Ginsburg). ARIMA forecasting
also anticipated the outcome of the cases on Table 10 within 10
points, although the analysis suggested that the 2004 tallies would still
demonstrate conservative (rather than liberal) control of closely di-
vided cases. 25 The Study anticipates a return to conservative control
next Term - a result that may well prove to be erroneous in light of
the death of the Chief Justice and the retirement of Justice O'Connor
(two relatively regular "conservative" votes on the Court).
2°
The significance of the liberal trend on Table 10 is difficult to es-
timate. Six of the 10 Tables of this Study (Tables 2, 3, 4, 6, 7 and 10)
demonstrate liberal movement in 2004 - with Tables 3 and 4 provid-
ing (according to factor analysis) relatively reliable indications that
ideological bias influenced the outcome of the decisions on those Ta-
bles. On the other hand, four Tables (1, 5, 8 and 9) indicate conserva-
tive movement, with factor analysis selecting Tables 1 and 9 as pro-
viding relatively reliable indications of ideological bias. Nevertheless,
the "conservative movement" on two of these Tables, 8 (dealing with
federal jurisdiction) and 9 (federalism questions) is questionable.
The Court retains an overall liberal posture on Table 8 despite
the conservative movement in 2004, and the rather small 10-point
conservative movement in the outcome of Split Decisions on Table 9
is offset by the fact that the Court still decided five of nine federalism
issues in 2004 against the state. Furthermore, while the outcome in
Split Cases on Table 9 moved in a conservative direction, the Court's
voting patterns on the substantive issues presented by those Split
Cases suggest that the Court may be rethinking its recent willingness
to defer to state regulatory power.
Finally, when the results of Table 7 are considered together with
the results of Table 10, a somewhat notable emergence of liberal vot-
203. See infra Chart 10.
204. See infra Mean Table 10.
205. See infra Data Table 10.
206. Id.
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ing power is revealed. On Table 7, the conservative voting patterns of
five Justices did not dictate a liberal outcome in Statutory Civil Rights
cases because this seeming "conservative bloc" did not vote together,
but instead fractured its voting power to join (one Justice here, an-
other one or two there) a more solid four-Member liberal bloc. This
quantitative evidence, combined with liberal control of the outcome
of Swing-Votes on Table 10, may suggest a significant consolidation
of liberal voting power in 2004.
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V. Category Analysis
Beginning in the 1996 Term, we began to analyze the effective-
ness of this Study's categories in measuring liberal and conservative
tendencies and trends. As might be expected, some categories turn out
to be more reliable indicators of ideological tendencies than others.
The reliability of the various tables in this study can be influ-
enced by many factors, including the particular makeup of the Court's
caseload and small sample size. Equal protection cases in Data Table
6, for example, tend to make up a small portion of the court's work-
load each term2 and are consistently the least reliable indicator of
ideological bias.
In order to determine which categories best differentiate
between the voting patterns of more liberal and more conser-
vative Justices, we have applied a statistical tool known as fac-
tor analysis.2" In applying this tool, we have determined that a
primary factor may be extracted from the Study's categories
over the entire life of the Study that accounts for more of the
variance revealed by the data on Tables 1 through 9 than any
other factor.2' We interpret this "Factor 1" as lib-
eral/conservative bias simply because that is what this Study














207. Over the previous three Terms there have only been five Equal Protection cases.
See authority at note 165 above.
208. 2002 Study, supra note 1, at 564.
209. For more information regarding factor analysis, see Appendix B.
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According to this ranking, Table 3 (Criminal/State Party) cases
are again the most reliable indicator of liberal/conservative leanings
over time; in fact, the ranking established by Factor Analysis is iden-
tical to that from last Term's analysis, except that Table 9 (Federal-
ism) has moved ahead of Table 4 (Criminal/Federal Party).2 10 These
three Tables along with Table f remain relatively reliable indicators
of ideological bias, while the remaining five continue to be of ques-
tionable value in that regard.
As we noted in last term's Study,2" these results may seem
counter-intuitive to those holding a stereotypical understanding of the
Court-that issues relating to the First Amendment, Statutory Civil
Rights, and Equal Protection would (seemingly) provide nearly per-
fect opportunities for the Justices to show their ideological leanings;
however, as we have discussed in two prior studies,"2 such cases often
involve "pole-switching," where Justices vote "conservatively" (under
the definitions of this Study) in order to further a "liberal" policy
preference, or vice versa.213 The prime example this Term is Kelo v.
New London, in which ostensibly "liberal" Justices, Stevens, Souter,
Ginsburg, and Breyer, joined by Justice Kennedy, voted "conserva-
tively" to favor a local government's power of eminent domain, pos-
sibly to further the "liberal" political view that urban renewal projects
should trump private property rights.
VI. Frontier Analysis
Attempting to quantify the magnitude of a Justice's liberal or
conservative tendencies and to identify trends in such tendencies over
time is challenging for a variety of reasons. One challenge already
discussed is that of choosing appropriate tests and assessing their va-
lidity. Another is dealing with inconsistency in the nature of cases
appealed to the Court from one Term to the next and the Court's se-
lection of which cases it will decide. With varying parameters such as
these, is there any meaningful way to quantify, analyze and compare
the Justices' inclinations? One potentially useful method is frontier
analysis .214
Frontier analysis focuses on the Justices' relative scores rather
than their absolute scores. Boundaries, or "frontiers," are defined by
210. 2003 Study, supra note 1, at 814.
211. Id.
212. See 2003 Study, supra note 1, at 814, 2002 Study, supra note 1, at 507-08.
213. 2003 Study, supra note 1, at 814.
214. For more information regarding frontier analysis, see infra Appendix B.
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the highest and lowest scores in each category and each combination
of categories. Each Justice is then evaluated relative to the estab-
lished frontier. By adjusting the relative weights allocated to each
category, the frontier can be adjusted to reflect each category's reli-
ability-as determined by the factor analysis described in Section V.
We present liberal and conservative frontier data for the Court
in Frontier Analysis Tables 1-4 and Frontier Analysis Charts 1-4.
Two versions of each frontier are presented.
In Frontier Analysis Tables 1 and 2, we constrain the weights ap-
plied to each category according to the factor analysis hierarchy in
Part V. On these Tables, weights are chosen for each Justice that
produce the highest frontier score for him or her, subject to the limi-
tation that Equal Protection (the least reliable category) cannot re-
ceive more weight than Civil/Federal Party (the next least reliable
category), Civil/Federal Party cannot receive more weight than Statu-
tory Civil Rights, and so forth, moving upward from the least reliable
category set out in Part V.
Frontier Analysis Tables 3 and 4 apply no weighting constraints
at all; instead, these tables choose, for each Justice, those weights that
present him or her in the most conservative or liberal light possible.
Each Table lists a "% of Frontier" score for each Justice. Those
with a score of 100% reach the frontier by employing the category
weight distribution shown in the category columns. Scores less than
100% indicate that the most conservative/liberal score the Justice
could obtain with optimal weighting places him or her at the indicated
percentage of the way toward the frontier. In some cases, an optimal
combination of weights may place a Justice beyond the frontier. This
condition is known as "superefficiency" and is noted in the charts
when present.
Frontier Analysis Charts 1 and 2 show the constrained scores for
each Justice over the course of this Study in graphical form. Near the
bottom of each chart is an indication of new Justices as they replace
outgoing Justices on the Court. Although former Justices' scores are
not indicated, they contributed to the determination of the liberal and
conservative frontiers during Terms in which they sat on the Court.
Frontier Analysis Charts 3 and 4 show each Justice's range of
constrained frontier scores during the course of this Study. They are
easier to read than the line graphs and give a clearer picture of the
Justice's relative positions and score ranges overall. They do not,
however, show any trend information.
According to the Frontier Analysis Table 1, "Conservative Fron-
tier - Constrained," Chief Justice Rehnquist lost his position as the
[Vol. 32:4
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most conservative Justice, replaced in that position by Justice Tho-
mas.215 Justice Thomas was the only Justice this Term that reached
the conservative frontier on the constrained Frontier Analysis Ta-
ble,216 with a superefficient score of 116%. This is an interesting score
because it is calculated by weighting the tables according to factor
analysis. 7 Justice Rehnquist fell to second most conservative justice
on this Table and nearly reached the frontier, with a score of 99%.218
Justices Stevens (57%) and Souter (56%) were the least conservative
Justices on the constrained Frontier Analysis Table.21 9 The rankings
on this Table did not shift much from 2003 to 2004.220
Frontier Analysis Table 2, which shows the results from of a con-
strained calculation of the liberal frontier, shows two Justices with su-
perefficient scores: Justices Stevens (109%) and Souter (105 %).221
Justice Souter's score is intriguing because, in calculating his score on
Table 2, all of the Tables were weighted equally (except for Equal
Protection). He was nevertheless still able to achieve a superefficient
score.22 2 Justice Thomas, as with Frontier Analysis Table 1, replaced
Justice Rehnquist as the least liberal Justice.'2
In the 2003 Term, the rank ordering of the Justices on Frontier
Analysis Tables 1 and 2 was rather unusual.2  This Term stands in
stark contrast, because the rank ordering is what might be expected.
In other words, a person might readily predict an individual Justice's
215. See infra Frontier Analysis Table 1.
216. See infra Frontier Analysis Table 1.
217. See Factor Analysis section for rankings. See also infra Frontier Analysis Table 1
(Justice Thomas is only measured on Civil/State, CriminallState, and Federalism).
218. See infra Frontier Analysis Table 1.
219. Id.
220. Justice Breyer scored a 77% again as he did last year. See 2003 Study, supra note
1, at 811 (Frontier Analysis Table 1). However, it is important to note that these numbers
are not comparable year to year. The frontier is different every year. Therefore, the
"quantity" that 77% represents may be more or less than the previous Term. What is
comparable however is how close the Justices come to the frontier in a given year. An
analogy would be comparing LSAT scores of students who took different tests (e.g., one
takes the October test and another takes the February test).
221. See infra Frontier Analysis Table 2.
222. See infra Frontier Analysis Table 2 (notice that Justice Souter's weights on all the
tables are "13" except for on Equal Protection which was left empty). Compare to Justice
Thomas on Frontier Analysis Table 1 who reached the Conservative Frontier but was only
weighed on Three tables. See infra Frontier Analysis Table 1.
223. See infra Frontier Analysis Table 2; compare 2003 Study, supra note 1, at 810
(Frontier Analysis Table 2).
224. See 2003 Study, supra note 1, at 816-17 (In 2003, the rank ordering of the Justices
on the two constrained tables seemed counterintuitive because Justices Scalia and Thomas
were not in their "opposite" positions across Tables).
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ranking on Table 2 if given that Justice's ranking on Table 1. The ar-
guably more "consistent" results on Frontier Analysis Tables 1 and 2
may be the result of fewer cases involving "pole-switching" behavior
and, accordingly, the Justices showed their "true" biases more accu-
rately this Term. The only two Justices that did not following identi-
cal ranking on Frontier Tables 1 and 2 are Justices Stevens and
Souter. However, their slight change of positions on the two Tables
225may well be of minimal importance.
Last Term the unexpected switch in rankings across Frontier Ta-
bles 1 and 2 was attributed to the theory "that Justices Scalia and
Thomas are not as bound to conservative or liberal ideologies as
other Members of the Court" and therefore their voting patterns
"demonstrated conservative and liberal patterns, as the constrained
Frontier Analysis Tables demonstrate. 226 While this may still be true,
another theory not explored last Term was that the switch in expected
ranking was due to "pole-switching," voting behavior that was in sub-
stantial evidence last Term.227
The unconstrained Frontier Analysis Tables maximize the effects
of pole-switching and other potentially "distorting" voting behaviors
and, therefore, do not provide very reliable evidence of conservative
or liberal bias. The real importance of the unconstrained Tables is
that they illustrate the value of the constrained analysis and the im-
portance of factor analysis.2
It is interesting to note that some Justices are unable to reach ei-
ther the unconstrained conservative or liberal frontiers - regardless of
the combination of weights used to enhance their conservative and
liberal voting tendencies. On Frontier Analysis Table 3, the uncon-
strained conservative table, Justice Kennedy fell short of the frontier
by two points, while Justice Souter was 25 points short of the conser-
vative frontier. Every other Member of the Court reached the con-
servative frontier, with four (the Chief Justice and Justices Thomas,
Breyer and O'Connor marking super-efficient scores. 9 On Uncon-
strained Frontier Analysis Table 4, showing the unconstrained liberal
225. See infra Frontier Analysis Tables 1 and 2. Justice Souter is the "least conserva-
tive" Justice but is only second place on the liberal table.
226. See 2003 Study, supra note 1, at 817.
227. See 2003 Study, supra note 1, at 814 (study discusses a couple of pole-switching
cases).
228. See 2003 Study, supra note 1, at 818 ("The unconstrained Frontier Tables amplify
the effects of pole-switching. Accordingly, the most reliable evidence of ideology on these
Tables comes from the constrained analysis.").
229. See infra Frontier Analysis Table 3.
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frontier, Justice O'Connor (87%), Chief Justice Rehnquist (83%) and
Justice Thomas (78%) all failed to reach the unconstrained liberal
frontier.23 This outcome may again evidence that the data for 2004 is
somewhat more reliable than in 2003; last Term, as a result of signifi-
cant pole-switching behavior, all of the Justices reached the liberal
frontier on the unconstrained analysis.231
VII. Conclusion
Last year the Study suggested that, "the United States Supreme
Court may have embarked on a new course. 2 32 We noted that the
"strength of the [liberal] trend is subject to reasonable dispute," but
nevertheless appeared "real. 2 33 The "reality" of this perceived trend
is now a question of great import: two Members of the Court will be
replaced before (or during) the 2005 Term.2 34 Furthermore, the con-
solidation of liberal voting power noted in 2003 appears to have con-
tinued. These two factors, the replacement of two Justices and the
apparent continuation in 2004 of the liberal movement first noted in
2002, may have significant impact on the future ideological course of
the United States Supreme Court.
2004 is the last full Term in which two distinguished jurists will sit
on the nation's highest judicial bench.235 Their departure - as the sta-
tistical data gathered by this Study over nearly two decades demon-
strates - has the unquestionable potential to alter the ideological
stance of the United States Supreme Court.
Justice O'Connor's construction of the Constitution and federal
legislation has frequently been decisive in controversial (and some-
230. See infra Frontier Analysis Table 4.
231. See 2003 Study, supra note 1, at 818.
232. See id. at 819.
233. Id.
234. At the time this Study was in final stages of preparation, it appeared more likely
than not that John Roberts would be confirmed as the new Chief Justice of the United
States Supreme Court. See, e.g., Deb Reichmann, Leahy to Back Roberts for Chief Justice,
Associated Press, September 21, 2005,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/worldlatest/story/0,1280,-5293033,00.html (last visited Septem-
ber 25, 2005) (noting that the ranking Democratic Senator on the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee would vote to confirm Roberts). Justice O'Connor's retirement announcement in-
cluded an assurance that she would continue to serve until a replacement was confirmed.
See, e.g., Associated Press, Senate Republicans Want O'Connor Successor On Court by Oc-
tober, http:llwww.azcentral.comspecialsispecial47/articles/070lScotusSenateOl-ON.htmI
(last visited September 21, 2005) (noting the content of Justice O'Connor's retirement an-
nouncement).
235. See note 234, supra, noting the possibility Justice O'Connor may serve for an ini-
tial period during the 2005 Term.
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times legally significant) cases decided by a single vote.236 Her views
have also been influential in the outcome of certain categories of
cases, particularly those involving state governments (such as those
tabulated on Tables 1, 3 and 9). Last Term, this Study noted what it
called "the O'Connor factor, '' 137 which demonstrated - as it does again
this Term - that Justice O'Connor's voting pattern in State Criminal
Cases is closely related to the outcome of Majority Cases on Table 3.
The late Chief Justice, for his part, has demonstrated relatively
stable consistent, conservative voting behavior during his tenure on
the Court, as review of the Study's Frontier Analysis demonstrates.
During the course of an 18-year period beginning in 1987, the Chief
Justice has held the "most conservative position" on the constrained
conservative frontier 11 times.3 Only three Members of the Court,
moreover, (Justices Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas) have ever exceeded
Chief Justice Rehnquist's position on Constrained Conservative
Frontier Chart 1 - Justice Scalia once, Justice Kennedy twice, and
Justice Thomas five times.239
Accordingly, the departure of these two Members could have a
major influence upon the ideological stance of an institution that will
lack the strong conservative voice of the late Chief Justice as well as
the moderating (but often conservative) influence of Justice
O'Connor. Unless the replacement for the late Chief Justice is as
consistently conservative as Chief Justice Rehnquist", or if the re-
placement for Justice O'Connor demonstrates ideological tendencies
even slightly less conservative (or more liberal) than hers, the newly
236. See Data Table 10 (demonstrating that, in the past 10 years, Justice O'Connor has
joined the opinions that determined the outcome of at least two-thirds of all cases decided
by a single vote, with the exception of the 1997 Term, where she joined the majority opin-
ions in only 53.7% of swing-vote cases, and this Term, where - by casting her vote with the
majority in 61.9% of these cases - she tied with Justices Kennedy and Souter as one of the
three most influential "swing voters" on the Court for 2004). In 2002, Justice O'Connor
joined every swing-vote majority. See infra Data Table 10. See infra note 200. 2003
Study, supra note 1, 823-24.
237. 2003 Study, supra note 1, at 823-24.
238. Constrained Frontier Analysis Chart 1 infra.
239. Constrained Conservative Frontier Chart 1 demonstrates that Justice Scalia held a
more conservative position in 1995, Justice Kennedy in 2000 and Justice Thomas in 1991,
1997, 2000, 2002 and 2004.
240. As this Conclusion was being written, it appeared that John Roberts would be
confirmed to replace the late Chief Justice William Rehnquist. See note 234, supra. Any
"prediction" regarding his "conservative" or "liberal" leanings, however, would be purely
speculative. Judge Roberts managed to avoid providing clear answers to many questions
from Senators seeking a firm grip on his judicial ideology. See, e.g., "Roberts Refuses to
Discuss Roe v. Wade," Womens' Issues Blog,
http://womensissues.about.com/b/a/202413.htm (last visited on September 25, 2005).
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constituted Court could readily continue (and intensify) the liberal
trend noted in 2002, 2003 and - now - 2004. This possibility is sup-
ported by this Study's results, which suggest that, during 2004, the in-
fluence of liberal voting blocs seemed to increase while conservative
voting blocs were less stable and (accordingly) less powerful.
The Study last year noted that the 2003 Term ended a "see-saw"
pattern of conservative-to-liberal-and-back-again movement. Rather
than a continuing pattern of ideological reversals, the Study found
that outcomes in 2002 and 2003 suggested a slight, overall liberal
trend.24' The 2003 Study explained that "one could plausibly assert
that 2003 Term voting patterns suggest either (a) a Court in transi-
tion, moving from a generally conservative to a somewhat more lib-
eral posture.., or (b) a Court that remains basically conservative,"
with the liberal trends noted in 2002 and 2003 "suggesting (at most) a
slight recalibration in the scales of justice. 212 As in 2003, "[e]ither de-
scription seems defensible on the basis of the data.
2 43
Nevertheless, the totality of the quantitative data in 2004 sug-
gests that assertion (a) may be somewhat more accurate than the al-
ternative possibility posited; the data collected and analyzed on Ta-
bles 1-10 above suggest that the Court may well be in transition from
a generally conservative to a somewhat more liberal posture. Never-
theless, and notwithstanding whatever opinions we could provide, the
jurists finally confirmed to replace the Chief Justice and Justice
O'Connor will ultimately determine whether the results of the 2005
Term continue to support possibility (b), confirm (instead) alternative
(b), or mark an entirely new ideological trend on the United States
Supreme Court (including the emergence of either notably more lib-
eral or conservative voting coalitions).
241. 2003 Study, supra note 1, at 819.
242. 2003 Study, supra note 1, at 771.
243. Id.
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1. The Universe of Cases
The only cases included in the database are those cases decided
by full opinion. Decisions on motions have been excluded even if ac-
companied by an opinion. Cases handled by summary disposition are
included only if they are accompanied by a full opinion of the Court
and not if the only opinion is a dissent. Cases decided by a four-four
vote resulting in affirmance without written opinion have been ex-
cluded. Both signed and unsigned per curium opinions are consid-
ered full opinions if they set forth reasons in a more than perfunctory
manner. Cases not fitting within any of these categories are not in-
cluded in the database for any of the tables.
2. Cases Classified as Civil or Criminal
The classification of cases as civil or criminal follows commonly
understood definitions. Generally, the nature of the case is clearly
identified in the opinion. Only occasionally does a case pose a prob-
lem of classification. No cases in 2001 raised such a question.
3. Cases Classified by Nature of the Parties-Data Tables 1 through 4
Cases are included on Data Tables 1 through 4 only if govern-
mental and private entities appear as opposing parties. This is neces-
sarily true of criminal cases. Civil cases are excluded from these ta-
bles if they do not satisfy this criterion. The governmental entity
might be the United States government or one of its agencies or offi-
cials or, with respect to a state government, one of its political subdi-
visions. A suit against a government official in a personal capacity is
included if that official is represented by government attorneys, or if
the interests of the government are otherwise clearly implicated. In
instances of multiple parties, a civil case is excluded if governmental
entities appear on both sides of the controversy. If both a state and a
federal entity are parties to the same suit on the same side with only
private parties on the other, the case is included on Data Tables 1 and
2. A case is included more than once on the same table if it raises two
or more distinct issues affecting the outcome of the case and the is-
sues are resolved by different voting alignments.
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4. Classification by Nature of the Issue-Data Tables 5 through 9
A case is included in each category of Data Tables 5 through 9
for which it raises a relevant issue that is addressed by written opin-
ion. One case may thus be included on two or more tables. A case is
also included more than once on the same table if it raises two or
more distinct issues in the category affecting the disposition of the
case and the issues are resolved by different voting alignments. A
case is not included on a table if an issue raised by one of the litigants
is not addressed in any opinion.
Identification of First Amendment and Equal Protection issues
poses no special problem since the nature of each claim is expressly
identified in the opinion. Issues of freedom of speech, press, associa-
tion, and free exercise of religion are included. However, Establish-
ment Clause cases are excluded since one party's claim of religious es-
tablishment is often made against another party's claim of free
exercise or some other individual right, thus blurring the issue of indi-
vidual rights.
Statutory civil rights included on Data Table 7 are limited to
those invoking the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Voting Rights Act of
1965 and other civil rights statutes expressly barring discrimination on
the basis of race, color, national origin, sex, religion, age or physical
handicap. Actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are included if the
substantive right asserted is based on a federal statute, or if the issue
involves the application of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to the case at hand.
However, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions are excluded if the substantive
right asserted is based on the United States Constitution and the issue
relates to that constitutional right. The purpose of this exclusion is to
preserve the distinction between constitutional and non-constitutional
claims.
For Data Table 8, jurisdictional questions are defined to include
not only jurisdiction per se, but also standing, mootness, ripeness, ab-
stention, equitable discretion and justiciability. Jurisdictional ques-
tions are excluded if neither party challenges jurisdiction and no
member of the Court dissents on the question, even though the Court
may comment on its jurisdiction.
Federalism cases on Data Table 9 are limited to those cases in
which there were issues raised by the conflicting actions of federal
and state or local governments. Common examples of these issues
are preemption, intergovernmental immunities, application of the
Tenth and Eleventh Amendments as a limit on federal government
action and federal court interference with state court activities (other
[Vol. 32:4
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than review of state court decisions). Issues of "horizontal" federal-
ism or interstate relationships, such as those raised by the dormant
Commerce Clause or the Privileges and Immunities Clause, are ex-
cluded from the table.
5. The Swing Vote Cases
Data Table 10 includes all cases where the outcome turns on a
single vote. This category includes five-four decisions and four-three
decisions, if any, as well as five-three and four-two decisions that re-
verse a lower court decision. Affirmances by a vote of five-three or
four-two are not included because a shift of one vote from the major-
ity to the minority position would still result in affirmance by a tie
vote. A case is included more than once in the table if it raises two or
more distinct issues affecting the disposition of the case and the issues
are resolved by different voting alignments.
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
APPENDIX B
Study Methodology
This Study seeks to quantify three characteristics of Supreme
Court voting behavior: voting trends, mean voting percentages and
relationships among the Justices' voting patterns. The following sec-
tions explain the statistical methods employed in this Study and how
test results should be interpreted.
A. Scores
Each score in this Study is simply the percentage of times a Jus-
tice voted in favor of the party or claim specified by the category.
Some categories contain fewer samples than others, resulting in
coarser score increments. For example, a category including ten cases
during the term will have the potential for eleven different scores
(0% through 100%, in 10% increments), while a category with only
one case during the Term will provide only two score possibilities
(0% and 100%).
B. Predictive Modeling
Data in this project were fitted to an Auto Regressive Integrated
Moving Average (ARIMA) forecasting model.24 This model is useful
in circumstances where, as in this Study, a single variable (a Justice's
score) is to be forecast based only on its present and prior values with
no other explanatory variables. ARIMA is an acronym for Auto Re-
gressive Integrated Moving Average. The model is most easily ex-
plained by starting in the middle of the acronym:
Integrated: This term refers to a differencing process
which operates in a manner similar to
differentiation of a continuous function in
calculus. The goal is simply to remove trend
from the time series data by subtracting each
score in the time series from the next score in
the series. The resulting differences form a
new time series. This operation may be
repeated successively until a trendless or
244. ARIMA computer modeling was accomplished using MINITAB® statistical
software with p = 1, d = 1, and q 1. For more information regarding the ARIMA (p,d,q)
model, see Peter Kennedy, A GUIDE TO ECONOMETRICS 248-49 (1992).
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"stationary" series results. Our model employs
only one differencing operation.
Auto-Regression:
Once the series has been made stationary, an
autoregressive parameter may be
determinedU'S This parameter seeks to relate
each data point in the stationary series to the
data point immediately preceding it through
multiplication. That is:
X = AX,.1
where X, is the value of the data series at point
t, A is the autoregressive parameter, and X,1 is
the value of the data series point immediately
preceding X,
Because. we are dealing with a series of data
points, however, a single parameter will almost
never precisely produce the relationship just
described for all data point pairs. Some error
is inevitable. We therefore seek to determine
that parameter which produces the least total
error when applied to the entire series.2 6
Moving Average:
A second parameter is determined that relates
the value of each series element X, to the error
between the estimated value and the actual
value of the previous element X,-. That is:
X, = -Bxt_1
where -B is the Moving Average parameter.
The value of this parameter is also optimized
to minimize its total error when applied to the
series.
245. Many statistical models employ more than one autoregressive parameter due to
various properties of the data series. Our data uses single-parameter (first order) AR and
MA models.
246. This is accomplished by applying least squares estimation, i.e., the parameter is
chosen such that the sum of the squared errors is minimized.
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Synthesis:
The previous operations are combined into the
equation:
X, = Ax,_,-Bx,.1 + E,
where E, represents the residual error
remaining between the calculated and actual
values of X,. This final equation is used to
predict the series score for the upcoming Term.
C. Mean Testing
We use a "student's t test, 247 to determine whether this Term's
score (X2), departs in a statistically significant manner from the mean
of all previous Terms' scores (X). Essentially, we treat these two
numbers as the means of two independent samples drawn from the
universe of all scores in the category.2 We hypothesize that X, is also
the true mean of the population p, and we set up this hypothesis (the
"null" hypothesis) and its corresponding alternative hypothesis as fol-
lows:
Ho: = The "null" hypothesis, i.e., X does not
significantly shift p from its previous value on
the real number line. Therefore, the two
samples are statistically equivalent.
H: p. X, The alternative hypothesis, i.e., X2 significantly
shifts V from its previous value on the real
number line. Therefore, the two samples are
not statistically equivalent.
We then set out to prove the alternative hypothesis, within a cer-
tain confidence interval,2 49 by rejecting the null hypothesis.250 This is
247. For a practical perspective on this procedure, see DAVID S. MOORE & GEORGE
P. MCCABE, INTRODUCTION TO THE PRACTICE OF STATISTICS 500-18 (2d ed. 1993). See
also HOGG & CRAIG, supra note 6.
248. This approach introduces potential bias problems due to non-random sampling,
small samples, and dissimilar sample standard deviations. Nevertheless, we use the test to
impose some measure of discipline in analyzing the available data.
249. We have selected a confidence interval of 95%. Because this is a two-tailed test
X 2 may shift p in either a positive or negative direction), * = .025.
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accomplished by calculating the following statistic:
X2-U
The result of this equation (t) is compared to the entry on a t-
distribution table corresponding to the confidence interval desired (e)
and the appropriate number of degrees of freedom (n-k).5 If the ab-
solute value of t is greater than the table entry, H. is rejected and we
say that the Justice has shown a statistically significant change in vot-
ing behavior this Term.
D. Correlation
Relationships between two Justices' voting records may be
mapped over a two-dimensional Cartesian plane as in Figures 1 and 2.
Figure 1 shows a high degree of positive correlation (R2=0.7921) be-
tween the voting percentages of the Chief Justice and Justice Scalia
for the Equal Protection category. The points all fall close to an up-
ward sloping line. On the other hand, Figure 2 shows that the voting
percentages of the Justice Scalia and Justice Stevens show only a very
weak, negative correlation (R2=0.0473). The points are widely scat-
tered about a downward sloping line. Statistically significant correla-
tions between and among Justices' Term-to Term voting percentages
are shown in Regression Tables 1-10. The first number in each pair is
the Pearson correlation coefficient. The second number is an r2 statis-
tic, which is a more reliable measure of the actual level of correla-
252tion.
250. A full description of the logic behind this seemingly convoluted procedure is be-
yond the scope of this article. However, its purpose is to control Type I (or alpha) error.
For a complete explanation, see MOORE & MCCABE, supra note 152.
251. k = the number of parameters being tested; here, V is the only hypothesized pa-
rameter, so k = 1.
252. The r2 statistic is an estimate of 02 , the true measure of correlation between the de-
pendant variable and its independent counterpart(s). The "adjusted" r 2 value in the tables
is a result of the computer's attempts to filter out any bias in the original r2 result.
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Figure 1
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The correlation measured in this case is in the Term-to-Term
movement of Justices' scores. A high correlation between two Justices
does not mean that they necessarily vote together often. It simply means
that their scores tend to move up and down together from one Term to
another. Also note that correlation in no way implies causation.
E. Factor Analysis
Factor analysis has long been used by psychologists who attempt
to identify characteristics of personality or intelligence by using bat-
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teries of tests. Their challenge has been to develop tests that validly
measure the characteristics of interest. This Study similarly attempts
to measure the Justices' liberal and conservative leanings by "testing"
their disposition of certain types of cases.
We performed a factor analysis of the Study categories using
Minitab software. The factor loadings presented were obtained by
extracting a single factor, using principal components analysis and
applying a QMAX rotation to the data. A full description of the the-
ory and mathematics underlying factor analysis is beyond the scope of
this appendix, but several books on the subject are available that pro-
vide reasonably simple explanations of this complex process.253
F. Frontier Analysis
Frontier analysis can probably best be described with an exam-
ple. Suppose four individuals are competing for the title of "world's







Alan would argue that the title should go to the best croquet
player because he has scored highest in the croquet category, while
Debbie would argue that the best marbles player should win because
each has scored highest in that category. On the other hand, Betty
would argue that each sport should receive equal weight, because her
combined score with equal weightings would be higher than either
Alan's or Debbie's, i.e., Betty would score (7 x 0.5) + (7 x 0.5) = 7,
while Alan would score (9 x 0.5) + (2 x 0.5) = 5.5, Chuck would score
4.5, and Debbie would score 5.5. The following figure plots the ath-
lete's scores graphically:
.. See generally Dennis Child, The Essentials of Factor Analysis (2d ed. 1990).
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A, B, C, and D represent the athletes. The solid line connecting
points A, B, and D represents the athletic frontier, i.e., the boundary
beyond which no athlete has performed regardless of the relative
weights assigned to marbles and croquet. A, B, and D are located at
100% of the frontier. Moreover, B can be said to be super-efficient to
the extent her point lies beyond the line AD connecting the two
points adjacent to it on the frontier. A and D are also super-efficient
to the extent they lie beyond lines (not shown) connecting B with the
points at which the frontier meets each axis. C falls short of the fron-
tier regardless of the weights assigned to marbles and croquet. How-
ever, an optimal set of weights may be selected such that C "looks his
best," i.e., he comes closest to reaching the frontier.
The same concept can be applied to the Court to determine
which Justice is "most conservative" or "most liberal." However, in-
stead of two dimensions (croquet and marbles), the Court analysis in-
cludes nine dimensions (all Study categories except Swing Votes).
Although human minds have difficulty envisioning nine dimensions,
computers can handle the required calculations with ease. We per-
formed our analysis using Microsoft Excel's solver feature. Although
the formulas and procedures involved are straightforward, a complete
254description of them is beyond the scope of this appendix.
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